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Abstract
What explains public opinion toward economic globalization, and specifically, toward
international trade? A wave of recent scholarship has shown that symbolic and identity-
based factors—individual predispositions such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, prejudice,
and cosmopolitanism—are highly correlated with attitudes toward trade. The nature of
the relationship between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion, however, remains conspic-
uously unclear. This dissertation combines fresh empirical strategies with the theoretical
tools of both economics and psychology to illuminate the role and effect of non-material
factors in the formation of public opinion toward international trade. I present a new
theoretical framework for the study of individual preferences in international political
economy, and test the empirical implications of the theory using observational data,
an original survey experiment, and systematic analysis of open-ended survey responses.
Specifically, I show: (1) that symbolic attitudes such a prejudice have a causal effect on
trade preferences, independent of economic considerations; (2) that the effect of economic
self-interest on trade preferences is contingent upon the strength of symbolic attitudes;
and (3) that the trade preferences of cosmopolitan individuals are susceptible to the effect
of subjective beliefs about the impact of trade on foreigners, providing the first evidence
of foreign-regarding motivations in the context of trade opinion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What explains public opinion toward economic globalization, and specifically, toward
international trade? A wave of recent scholarship has shown that symbolic and identity-
based factors—individual predispositions such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, cosmopoli-
tanism, and prejudice—are highly correlated with attitudes toward trade (e.g., Dong et
al. 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke
and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001). This constitutes one of the most important recent de-
velopments in the study of mass attitudes in international political economy (IPE), and
perhaps in the study of IPE overall. But despite an impressive array of research into the
non-material sources of trade preferences, the nature of the relationship between symbolic
attitudes and trade opinion remains conspicuously unclear. Indeed, a set of fundamental
questions call for answers.
First, do individual-level symbolic attitudes such as prejudice have an independent
causal effect on trade preferences? Second, how can the effect of symbolic factors be
reconciled with the predictions of conventional, self-interest-based models of preferences
in political economy? In other words, if, as studies of survey data suggest, both mate-
rial and symbolic factors matter, what is relationship between the two in the formation
of public opinion toward trade? Finally, is the role of symbolic attitudes in the forma-
tion of trade preferences different at opposite ends of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum
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(e.g., for “prejudiced”1 individuals versus “cosmopolitans”)? The three central chapters
of this dissertation address these key gaps in our understanding of public opinion toward
international trade.
Although each chapter is written as a stand-alone paper, all share a common the-
oretical core: throughout the dissertation, I employ the tools of both psychology and
economics to build a coherent theoretical foundation for the study of individual prefer-
ences in IPE. Specifically, I draw upon the notion of heuristic judgment from behavioral
economics and the theory of symbolic politics from political psychology to argue that
trade preferences are primarily the product of emotional rather than cognitive responses.
The implications of my theory are then tested in the American context with observational
data, an original survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample, and the
systematic analysis of open-ended survey responses. In sum, this dissertation combines
a new theoretical framework with innovative empirical strategies to move the literature
in this area from a mostly dichotomous debate over the relative strength of material ver-
sus non-material factors to a more nuanced, comprehensive, and theoretically-grounded
understanding of voter behavior with respect to globalization.
Chapter 2, “What’s in Name? Investigating the Causal Effect of Prejudice on Indi-
vidual Trade Preferences,” addresses the question: Does prejudice have an independent
causal effect on public attitudes toward trade? For over a decade, students of pub-
lic opinion have consistently observed a strong statistical association between symbolic
attitudes such as prejudice and nationalism, on the one hand, and opposition to inter-
national trade, on the other. But as multiple scholars have correctly pointed out, this
correlation—however strong and consistent—does not shed light on the important ques-
tion of causation. To address this question, I first provide a theoretical foundation for
the causal claim that cultural prejudice increases protectionism. Then, to investigate the
claim empirically, I employ a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally represen-
tative sample of Americans, manipulating only the name of a hypothetical foreign firm
1Throughout this dissertation, the term “prejudiced” is used simply as a label for those who have
especially negative attitudes toward out-groups. Clearly, this designation is not intended as an indictment
of those individuals’ character.
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that would be affected by a proposed U.S. trade agreement. I find that among prejudiced
Americans, “cultural distance” from trading partners more than doubles the level of op-
position to international trade, independent of economic considerations. These results
strongly suggest that prejudice causes an increase in protectionism, and that this causal
effect is very large.
Chapter 3, “Feelings First: Non-Material Factors as Moderators of Economic Self-
Interest Effects on Trade Preferences,” reconciles the findings of Chapter 2 with the pre-
dictions of conventional, self-interest-based models of public opinion in political economy.
While studies have shown that, on average, both economic and symbolic factors affect
trade preferences, the micro-foundations of preference formation—the particular role of
these two types of factors, and their relationship to one another in that process—have
neither been theorized, nor investigated empirically. This chapter takes a substantial
step in that direction, illuminating—and ultimately breaking—the “material versus non-
material” dichotomy that has come to characterize this area of scholarship.
In this chapter, I advance a theoretical framework grounded in psychology that ac-
counts for both material and non-material sources of trade opinion and, importantly,
specifies the relationship between the two. I predict that the effect of self-interest is not
uniform across individuals, but rather, conditional upon the strength (whether positive
or negative) of symbolic attitudes—in this case, an individual’s attitude toward foreign
cultural influences. I test this proposition using data from an original survey of over
four thousand American workers. My key finding is strong and striking: industry-based,
material self-interest is a “second order” consideration that acquires salience only when
symbolic attitudes are weak. Symbolic sources of trade preferences, on the other hand,
are primary, “first order” factors that can altogether trump the contribution of economic
self-interest to an individual’s stance trade. Put differently, non-material factors define
the scope conditions for models of trade opinion based on material self-interest.
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on those with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups,
finding that the trade preferences of these “cosmopolitan” individuals are shaped by their
beliefs about the effect of trade on foreigners. Subjective beliefs about the impact of
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international trade have recently been presented as key sources of individual trade pref-
erences. In particular, beliefs about trade’s effect on one’s self and family, and more
prominently, perceptions of how trade impacts one’s country as a whole have been ad-
vanced as important sources of public opinion toward trade. Chapter 4 considers the
possibility that trade preferences are shaped by subjective beliefs about the impact of
trade beyond one’s borders. I introduce the notion of foreign-regarding considerations
into the study of globalization opinion, arguing that perceptions of trade’s impact abroad
can shape public opinion toward trade at home. Specifically, and as mentioned above,
I contend that the trade preferences of cosmopolitans are especially susceptible to the
effect of foreign-regarding considerations. To examine these claims empirically, I employ
a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans,
supplementing the results with an analysis of open-ended responses provided by all the
subjects. Taken together, the findings of this chapter provide the first evidence of foreign-
regarding motivations in the context of trade preferences. They also show that the role
of symbolic attitudes in the formation of trade preferences is not necessarily identical at
both ends of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum.
In brief, the chapters that follow advance the contours of scholarship on public opinion
in IPE by addressing three central questions in the study of individual preferences over
trade. The implications of this research for politics and policy are significant. We operate
in a political context where public debates over foreign economic policy are commonly
framed in symbolic and emotional terms, and where trade agreements are increasingly
negotiated with specific countries and regions—each with cultural, as well as economic,
characteristics. In this setting, a clear understanding of the ways in which non-material
factors interact with economic considerations to affect public support for global economic
integration is essential if one is to effectively navigate all the contours of the globalization
debate.
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Chapter 2
What’s in Name? Investigating the
Causal Effect of Prejudice on
Individual Trade Preferences
2.1 Introduction
Does prejudice have a causal effect on trade preferences? For over a decade, students of
public opinion have consistently observed a strong statistical association between sym-
bolic attitudes such as prejudice and nationalism, on the one hand, and opposition to
international trade, on the other (Dong et al. 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit
2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001). This con-
stitutes one of the most important recent developments in the study of mass attitudes
in international political economy. But as multiple scholars have correctly pointed out,
this correlation—however strong and consistent—does not shed light on the important
question of causality (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012; Margalit 2012). Despite an impres-
sive array of research into the non-material sources of trade preferences, the nature of
the relationship between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion remains conspicuously un-
clear. This ambiguity represents a fundamental gap in the IPE literature. If prejudice
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does not cause protectionist trade sentiment, then the correlation we observe becomes
largely irrelevant to explanations of public attitudes toward trade. Addressing the causal
question is thus of central importance
Causal inference in this context is not easy. Observational studies are especially
challenged in isolating the independent effect of prejudice on protectionism, and the use
of randomized experiments toward this end has been very limited. This chapter employs
a creative experimental design to overcome this inferential problem. I take inspiration
from Bertrand and Mullainathan’s famous resume experiment (2004)—where names on
identical resumes are manipulated to identify the presence of racial discrimination in
the U.S. labor market—and investigate the effect of “cultural distance” from trading
partners on individual trade preferences. The survey experiment, fielded on a nationally
representative sample of Americans, cleanly isolates the effect of cultural distance by
manipulating only the name of a hypothetical foreign firm that would be affected by a
potential U.S. trade measure. I find that among prejudiced Americans, cultural distance
from trading partners more than doubles the level of opposition to international trade.
This result strongly suggests that the causal effect of symbolic attitudes on trade opinion
is both real and strong: prejudice greatly increases protectionism.
The implications of this finding are significant. Not only does it shed light on a
particularly fundamental question in the IPE literature, but it also highlights the potential
impact of prejudice on the politics of trade and on the contours of international trade
policy more broadly.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. I begin by presenting theoretical
foundations for the causal claim, building upon the notion of heuristic judgment from
behavioral economics and the theory of symbolic politics from political psychology. Next,
Section 2.3 reviews obstacles to causal inference in observational studies of public opinion
and examines the limits of past experimental research into the effect of symbolic attitudes
on trade preferences. In Section 2.4, I thoroughly describe the experimental design of
this study. Section 2.5 presents the results of the experiment, while Section 2.6 considers
the robustness of these findings. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Prejudice and Protectionism: Situating the
Relationship
2.2.1 Evidence of Strong Correlation
There is mounting evidence that symbolic attitudes1 of various kinds—prejudice, ethno-
centrism, nationalistic chauvinism—are strongly associated with opposition to interna-
tional trade. For example, Sinnott and O’Rourke (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005)
analyze the same cross-national survey data to find that various measures of nationalist
sentiment are strongly correlated with protectionist trade preferences. Likewise, Rankin
(2001) argues that nationalistic attachment is a key factor in explaining mass attitudes
toward trade. Focusing on the United States, Rankin finds that attachment to what he
calls “patriotic,” “sovereign,” and “cultural” conceptions of national identity are all highly
correlated with protectionism.
To capture symbolic attitudes, Mansfield and Mutz’s 2009 study of American trade
opinion relies primarily on ethnocentrism scales designed to measure “the commonplace
inclination to divide the world into ingroups and outgroups, the former characterized by
virtuosity and talent, the latter by corruption and mediocrity” (Kam and Kinder 2007, p.
321). As Mansfield and Mutz explain, ethnocentrism taps “prejudice, broadly conceived”
(p. 440). Once again in this study, the association between symbolic attitudes—in this
case, ethnocentrism—and trade protectionism is strong. More recently, Dong et al. (2013)
replicate this finding using a sample of Chinese citizens. And in yet another example,
Chapter 3 of this dissertation finds that in a survey of over 4,000 U.S. workers, sentiment
toward foreign cultures powerfully predicts individual trade opinion.
2.2.2 Theoretical Foundations for the Causal Claim: Affective
Judgment and Symbolic Politics
These observational studies consistently reveal one finding: symbolic predispositions such
as prejudice are strongly associated with protectionist attitudes toward international
1The terms “symbolic attitudes” and “symbolic predispositions” are also used interchangeably in this
chapter.
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trade. While the theoretical basis of this finding is left unexplored and underdeveloped
in many studies, political psychology offers a compelling and theoretically grounded ex-
planation for this consistent result (Rankin 2001). Indeed, theories of heuristic judgment
and symbolic politics from psychology expect this association to not only be strong, but
also to be causal: prejudice should increase protectionism.
Consider first that rationality, as a cognitive process, can be very demanding. As
research in social psychology indicates, the mind relies on shortcuts wherever possible
to avoid the effortful mental work of conscious and deliberate reasoning. This idea is
famously articulated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who argued in their No-
bel prize-winning work that individuals use “heuristics”2 to simplify complex decisions
into quick, intuitive judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Such heuristics are not
consciously chosen. Rather, they are part of a “mental shotgun” whereby the mind instinc-
tively evades the demanding work of complex reasoning by substituting an easier question
for a difficult one—typically without noticing the substitution (Kahneman 2011).
One of the most commonly used intuitive heuristics in decision making involves re-
liance on emotion or affect (Kahneman 2011; Sears 2001).3 The notion of affective judg-
ment was introduced into the heuristics lexicon by psychologist Paul Slovic as an affect
heuristic (Slovic et al. 2002). Building on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, Slovic
observed a process of decision making in which judgments are guided directly by reflexive
gut feelings of liking and disliking, without deliberation or reasoning. The affect heuristic,
in other words, is an instance of substitution where the answer to an easy question (How
do I feel about it?) serves subconsciously as an answer to a much harder question (What
do I think about it?).
The world of politics is not immune to the shortcuts of the human mind. In the realm
of political preference formation, the notion of judgment through affective response finds
prominent expression in the theory of symbolic politics. According to this theory, peo-
ple acquire early in life a set of broad and highly stable “symbolic” predispositions (e.g.,
2The technical definition of heuristic is “a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often
imperfect, answers to difficult questions” (Kahneman 2011).
3I follow Neuman et al. (2007) and use the terms “emotion” and “affect” interchangeably.
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prejudice, nationalism, political ideology) which drives their attitudes toward particular
political issues in adulthood (Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980). Importantly, sym-
bolic predispositions drive political preferences by way of the affective shortcuts discussed
above. Later in life, as an individual is confronted with new and unfamiliar policy issues,
the symbols posed by those issues evoke habitual and highly affective responses based
on the person’s longstanding symbolic attitudes. As Sears et al. explained when they
introduced the theory in the late 1970s, the political symbols posed by issues such as “in-
tegration” and “affirmative action,” for example, evoke habitual and emotional responses
based on underlying predispositions such as racial tolerance or prejudice (1979). More
recently, it has been shown that racial attitudes are an important driver of public opinion
toward health care reform policy in the United States (Tesler 2012). The policy—widely
known as “Obamacare”—is closely associated with an African American President, and
thus, as a policy issue, it evokes an automatic gut reaction rooted in attitudes toward
race.
The theory of symbolic politics therefore implies a distinctive mode of information
processing which proceeds by way of strong affective responses to political symbols. In
the arena of mass politics, then, strong symbolic predispositions make possible the cog-
nitive shortcut of judgment via affect: when the relevant predispositions are sufficiently
strong, the gut feelings evoked by political issues direct preferences, making a demanding
cognitive process unnecessary.
My claim is that individual judgments about international trade are no exception.
The theory of symbolic politics suggests that the symbols associated with trade—it rep-
resents a transaction with a “foreign other,” for instance—evoke an affective response
based on stable symbolic predispositions such as generalized prejudice, nationalism, or
aversion toward out-groups. To put it in the language of heuristics, the difficult and com-
plex question—“What do I think about trade?”—is displaced by the much easier question:
“How do I feel about it?” The resulting hypothesis is clear: individual preferences over
trade will be directly affected by individual-level predispositions such as prejudice. Put
differently, prejudice should have an independent effect on mass attitudes toward inter-
9
national trade.
As already demonstrated, evidence of a strong, positive relationship between prej-
udice and protectionism is plentiful. Empirically identifying the causal nature of this
relationship, however, presents challenges that are difficult to overcome in observational
studies. I now turn to this inferential problem.
2.3 Prejudice, Protectionism, and Causal Inference:
The Limits of What We Know
2.3.1 Obstacles to Causal Inference in Observational Studies of
Trade Preferences
The studies referenced in Section 2.1 make a significant contribution to our understanding
of mass attitudes toward trade by suggesting that trade preferences might be influenced
by non-economic, symbolic attitudes. As skeptics of the “non-material” interpretation
of trade preferences correctly point out, however, the meaning of a strong relationship
between one attitude and another is essentially ambiguous (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012).
The causal priority of prejudice, in other words, is far from obvious in this context.
It is possible, for instance, that a causal link between non-material sentiment and trade
opinion does exist, but that causality runs in the reverse direction. It might be that, in
fact, opposition to free trade or a generally negative posture toward global economic
integration results in contempt toward out-groups and foreignness. International trade
is, after all, an interaction with some foreign “other.” That strong opposition to trade
could color one’s broader outlook on “otherness” is not implausible.
It is also possible that the strong relationship we observe between symbolic attitudes
and trade opinion is a spurious one: some other factor might be causing both. For exam-
ple, it could be that an individual’s attitudes toward trade and outgroups are both the
result of her association with some group or doctrine. Fordham and Kleinberg illustrate
this point nicely:
Groups adopt common positions on many issues. Some common attitudes
are logically unrelated but are nevertheless consistent within the group. For
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example, members of a particular occupation might dress or speak in a similar
way to show their solidarity—or simply to blend in—even if nothing about
their job requires them to do so. Even though one would certainly find a
strong statistical relationship between these modes of dress and speech and
the attitudes typical of the group, this relationship is not causal. . . The same
problem of causal inference applies to associations between logically unrelated
attitudes on less trivial matters. A group might be especially patriotic, eth-
nocentric, or isolationist, but there is not necessarily a causal relationship
between these attitudes and the group’s typical position on trade (2012, p.
323).
Needless to say, the “third” factor driving both prejudice and protectionism may very
well be some underlying economic interest. Trade competition with an ethnically distant
nation could lead to both anti-trade sentiment and prejudice or chauvinistic nationalism.
It is thus far from clear that the statistical association we observe between prejudice
and trade opinion is evidence that symbolic attitudes enjoy causal priority in connection
to protectionism. The claim that prejudice has a causal effect on trade preferences—
and especially, that this effect is independent of economic interests—calls for the design
of research that can specifically test the causal nature of the relationship. This is a
crucially important task in the study of globalization opinion. As Margalit explains, “[If]
non-economic sentiments are not the cause of support for trade protectionism, then the
correlation [that] scholars find is irrelevant for explaining the sources of popular opposition
to trade openness” (Margalit 2012, p. 484).
2.3.2 Past Experimental Study of Symbolic Predispositions and
Trade Opinion
Despite the obstacles to causal inference in observational studies, the use of randomized
experiments to detect the effect of symbolic predispositions on trade attitudes has been
extremely limited. The only experimental study of which I am aware was carried out
by Margalit (2012).4 His survey experiment was fielded on a sample of 1,455 American
respondents who were randomly assigned to either a control or one of two treatment
groups. The first treatment group was exposed to a “cultural” prime; the second to a
4Mansfield and Mutz (forthcoming) present the results of a survey experiment designed to test the
relationship between symbolic attitudes and preferences over another dimension of globalization, namely,
outsourcing.
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“libertarian” prime. The cultural prime treatment consisted of a set of questions about
social and cultural issues which relate to changes in the traditional American way of life—
whether the U.S. national anthem should be sung in languages other than English, and
whether homosexual couples should be allowed to legally marry. In contrast, individuals
in the control group were exposed to questions about their preferences over outdoor
activities. All respondents were then asked: “Do you think that growing trade and
business ties of the United States with other countries have made the average American
better or worse off?”
Margalit’s results show that respondents exposed to the cultural prime express more
negative views of the impact of economic integration than either those in the control group
or in the libertarian treatment group—but this treatment effect is only observed among
the less-educated. Margalit takes this finding to suggest both that cultural concerns do
indeed have a causal effect on trade opinion, and that the less-educated are “more likely
to associate economic integration with a set of social and cultural consequences that they
view as harmful” (2012, p. 495). The latter conclusion is attributed by the author to the
fact that educational attainment is negatively correlated with factors such as prejudice,
intolerance of other cultures, and feelings of in-group superiority.
While this study is path-breaking in many respects, it is also susceptible to a number
of critiques, especially as an investigation into the independent causal effect of symbolic
attitudes. More generally, the experimental investigation of any challenging research
question benefits from refinement through the development and implementation of diverse
designs. In this study, I build upon Margalit’s important contribution, benefiting from
the strengths of his experimental design while trying to address its weaknesses.
First, for the purposes of distinguishing the effect of cultural concerns from economic
ones, Margalit’s experimental manipulation is somewhat limited. In line with the general
argument of his paper (the survey experiment is only one part of a broader study), the
cultural treatment is meant to prime a sense of “cultural threat” by reminding respondents
of potentially imminent changes to the traditional American way of life. But it is quite
plausible that this particular manipulation (if indeed, it is successful) triggers a feeling of
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generalized threat to one’s “way of life”—a feeling that might subsume or easily spillover
to other, namely economic, aspects of life. In other words, by specifically highlighting
impending threats to a way of life rather than employing a more subtle prime of underlying
symbolic predispositions, the study is less likely to preclude from the subject’s judgment
considerations of economic loss or threat.
Given the nature of Margalit’s argument, this issue might not be problematic for his
study. He argues, after all, that global economic integration is generally perceived as an
“openness package,” the “broad and complex effects” of which are difficult for individuals
to disentangle and separately assess (2012, p. 486). To specifically isolate the effect
of prejudice, however, an experimental manipulation that subtly primes prejudice while
keeping economic factors constant is far more suitable.
Toward this end, the experimental design and robustness checks I present below ex-
plicitly control for other variables that might explain the correlation between cultural
concerns and negative trade opinion. Specifically, the economic, political, and safety-
related implications of trade are specified and held constant. I can therefore be confident
that any treatment effect observed in my study is due to cultural factors and not the
result of assumptions made by respondents about other aspects of trade.
In order to distinguish those who received the treatment from those who did not,
my study also includes a post-treatment manipulation check. Unfortunately, without
such a check in Margalit’s design, we cannot know whether his cultural prime was in
fact successful in encouraging heightened cultural concern. This is especially problematic
since the effect of his cultural treatment depends on low educational attainment. As
Margalit himself points out, it “may be that the effect of the prime on individuals with
lower education was stronger not because of their cultural sensitivities, but simply because
they are more susceptible to priming” (p. 495).
Finally, the use of education as a proxy for prejudice or “cultural sensitivity” is less
than ideal. Margalit suggests that a cultural treatment effect is observed only among
the less-educated because these individuals are more likely to be prejudiced, ethnocen-
tric, nationalist, and so on. But if, theoretically speaking, the relevant characteristic is
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prejudice or nationalism, then conditioning the analysis on a more direct measure of that
symbolic predisposition would offer a much more revealing and direct test of the under-
lying argument. I overcome this limitation by including in my survey a direct measure
of individual prejudice.
2.4 Experimental Design
2.4.1 Overview
To investigate the effect prejudice on trade preferences, I designed a population-based
survey experiment (Mutz 2011) that builds upon the studies discussed in the preceding
section. The experiment was fielded on a sample of 1,001 Americans from July 13 to July
16, 2013. The GfK Group conducted the survey using the web-enabled KnowledgePanel,
a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially,
participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and
residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by
mail to participate in the KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do
not already have internet access, GfK provides at no cost a laptop and ISP connection.
People who already have computers and internet service are permitted to participate
using their own equipment.
The experiment employs a creative design to resolve the inferential problem described
in Section 2.3. I take inspiration from Bertrand and Mullainathan’s famous resume
experiment (2004), where names on identical resumes are manipulated to identify racial
discrimination in the U.S. labor market, to investigate the effect of “cultural distance”
from trading partners on individual trade preferences. All subjects were informed of
a potential policy measure that would ease U.S. trade restrictions and make it easier
for some foreign firms to sell their products in the United States. Subjects were then
presented with the hypothetical example of one company that would be affected by such
a trade measure (i.e., a foreign company for whom it would become easier to export goods
into the U.S. as a result of the trade policy under consideration). Finally, respondents
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were asked to report their level of support for the potential trade measure.
The key experimental manipulation of the study concerns the name of the hypothet-
ical foreign firm that was presented to respondents. Subjects were assigned to a firm
name that was shown (through prior experimental investigation—see below) to sound
either culturally familiar or ambiguously foreign. A second manipulation involved the
economic characteristics of the hypothetical firm, specifically, whether the skill level of
the company’s labor input is high or low. In all treatment conditions, respondents were
explicitly informed that the hypothetical foreign firm is from a country that poses no
political or security threats to the United States, and that the company respects safety
and labor standards. Furthermore, and as mentioned previously, I collect data on respon-
dents’ levels of prejudice, enabling me to test directly the proposition that the effect of
the “culturally foreign” treatment is contingent on a high degree of individual prejudice.
By keeping constant the economic characteristics of the firm, as well as the political
relationship of the United States with the firm’s country of origin, this strategy makes
it possible to cleanly isolate the causal effect of cultural distance from trading partners
on individual trade preferences. If exposure to the culturally distant firm name increases
protectionism, and if this effect, in turn, is contingent upon high levels of individual
prejudice, then we can infer that generalized prejudice in the form of aversion to out-
groups and foreignness is driving the increased opposition to trade. In other words, this
design makes it possible to directly investigate for the first time whether cultural prejudice
is causally prior to trade preferences, independent of other considerations.
2.4.2 Culturally Familiar versus Ambiguously Foreign: The
Choice of Firm Names
Clearly, the choice of a culturally foreign and a culturally familiar firm name is crucial to
the success of this study and to the credibility of its findings. Most importantly, in order
to avoid the possibility that the results are driven by the cultural, economic, or political
characteristics of any one country or part of the world, it is essential that the name used
to signal cultural distance is ambiguously foreign. That is to say, the chosen name should
not be easily or overwhelmingly associated by subjects with a single country or cluster of
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countries. Rather, what is needed is a name whose believed origin enjoys a relatively even
distribution across a reasonably broad range of culturally distant countries and regions.
Given this criterion, I tested the suitability of numerous invented and quasi-invented
names through a series of surveys on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Respondents
on MTurk were asked: “[Firm Name] is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company.
Which country or part of the world would you say that [Firm Name] is from? Please be
as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those
that come immediately to mind.” Based on responses to this question, I finally identified
the name “Tuntyakore & Zideying” as an ideal candidate. The preceding question was
also posed at the outset of this survey to those in the culturally foreign treatment group of
the nationally representative sample. Their answers—classified according to the standard
United Nations Geographical Region Groupings5 and represented in Figure 2.1—confirm
the suitability of “Tuntyakore & Zideying” as an ambiguously foreign firm name.
As a company name that signals cultural proximity, I chose “Gordon & Roberts.”
MTurk respondents identified this name primarily with the United Kingdom, but “Gordon
& Roberts” was also strongly associated with Canada and a number of other Western
European countries. The responses of those in the culturally familiar treatment group
of the nationally representative sample, again offered at the outset of this survey and
represented in Figure 2.2, largely reflect the MTurk findings.
Needless to say, this study relies heavily on the assumption that cultural distance is
binary in the context of trade preference formation. While this assumption is unlikely to
be accurate, it is both reasonable and highly useful: it enables us to directly address a
central—and as yet unresolved—research question in the study of globalization.
5See United Nations Statistics Division (2013).
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Figure 2.1: Tuntyakore & Zideying’s Believed Country of Origin.
Note: Figure 2.1 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question:
“Tuntyakore & Zideying is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part
of the world would you say that Tuntyakore & Zideying is from? Please be as specific as possible and
remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind.” I clas-
sified countries and geographic areas according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region
Groupings, with three exceptions. First, I collapse the sub-regions identified by the UN classification as
Northern, Western, and Southern Europe into the one category commonly known as “Western Europe.”
Second, because about 50% of the respondents who identified Tuntyakore & Zideying as being from the
African continent did so by simply identifying the continent as a whole (i.e., “Africa”), I collapse the UN’s
African sub-regions into one category. Note that among the remaining 50% of responses that identified
the name as African, but did so more specifically by identifying a particular country or sub-region of the
continent, no particular area of Africa was overrepresented. In other words, all areas of the continent
were represented relatively evenly. Third, I include an additional category called “Asia” to represent
the small minority who responded to the question by simply answering “Asia” and not specifying any
particular country or region within that continent.
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Figure 2.2: Gordon & Roberts’ Believed Country of Origin.
Note: Figure 2.2 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question: “Gor-
don & Roberts is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world
would you say that Gordon & Roberts is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the
most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind.”
2.4.3 Stimulus and Manipulation Check
A explained above, respondents were exposed to information about the hypothetical for-
eign firm. Specifically, they were presented with the following information and question:
Now consider that the United States is contemplating the removal of trade
restrictions which would allow some foreign companies to more freely sell
their goods in the United States. As a hypothetical example, consider the
case of [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ], one such foreign firm.
[Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] has the following characteristics:
It has about 500 workers.
[Over 90% of its workers are not college educated, and approximately 60% have
not completed high school./Approximately 60% of its workforce has a PhD or
other advanced degree, and over 90% of its workforce is university educated.]
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The company respects safety and labor standards, and is based in a country
that poses no political or security threats to the United States.
Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow
firms such as [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] to more freely sell
their goods in the United States?
Response options spanned a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly support” to “Strongly
oppose.” The two manipulations yield a 2x2 design with four treatment conditions.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these four groups.
As explained in Section 2.4.2, respondents were asked to guess the geographic origin
of Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts in the survey’s opening question. The next
question on the survey (still before exposure to the firm-related information and question
above) was designed to strengthen the effectiveness6 of the treatment by asking subjects:
“Think for a few moments about the country or part of the world that [Tuntyakore &
Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] is from. What language or languages are spoken there? If
you’re not sure, don’t worry—just take a guess.” The purpose of this second question is
simply to fix in the respondent’s mind her original guess, reducing the likelihood that she
would change her mind about the firm’s country of origin (and potentially, its cultural
familiarity or foreignness) upon learning of the firm’s other characteristics.
To monitor the latter possibility, I included the following post-treatment manipula-
tion check after measuring the dependent variable: “Did you continue to assume that
[Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] is from [respondent’s original answer ]?”
Those who answered “no” were asked where they assumed Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon
& Roberts to be from. Over 80% of respondents maintained their original answer. Those
who changed their mind did not do so in a way that significantly altered the original
distribution of guesses across different regions of the world. As a result, the changed
answers do not lead to a noticeable shift away from the effectiveness of the experimental
6I use the term “effective” here to mean that the treatment is effective in producing the intended
variation in the independent variable, not that it is effective in altering the dependent variable. The
latter kind of effectiveness, of course, depends on whether my theory is correct and will be examined in
Section 2.5 (Mutz 2011, Chapter 6).
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manipulation.7
2.4.4 Measuring Prejudice and Protectionism
If cultural distance or foreignness has a causal effect on trade preferences, we should
observe greater opposition to the hypothetical easing of trade restrictions among those
exposed to the culturally foreign firm name, Tuntyakore & Zideying, versus those exposed
to the culturally familiar firm name, Gordon & Roberts. In line with the hypothesis
derived from the theory I advance in Section 2.2, however, the effect of this manipulation
should be moderated by the level of individual prejudice. Among the prejudiced, in other
words, the perceived cultural foreignness of Tuntyakore & Zideying should trigger an
automatic, emotional judgment against trade liberalization.
Measuring individual levels prejudice is thus of central importance in this study. To
do so, I use an abridged Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) index. SDO scales, used
by psychologists to measure racial and ethnic prejudice, offer a number of significant
advantages which have not yet been exploited in the study of symbolic attitudes and
trade preferences.
The concept of SDO comes from Social Dominance Theory, a social psychological
theory based on the idea that “all human societies tend to be structured systems of
group-based hierarchies” consisting of “one or a small number of dominant and hegemonic
groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate groups at the bottom” (Sidanius and
Pratto 1999, p. 31). From this theory emerged the individual-level variable called social
dominance orientation, “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate or
be superior to out-groups” (Pratto et al. 1994). As Pratto et al. explain, “We consider
SDO to be a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether
one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along
a superior-inferior dimension” (Pratto et al. 1994, p. 741).
SDO is very strongly and consistently correlated with both racism and nationalism
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Importantly, these correlations hold even when rather differ-
7Further details are presented in Figures 1A and 2A of Appendix A.
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ent measures of racism and nationalism are used. This reflects one of the great strengths
of SDO as a measure of symbolic predispositions in this context, namely, that it has
been shown to capture the underlying predisposition (i.e., a generalized preference for
group dominance) that drives more specific, and often culturally-contingent, symbolic
attitudes (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 1992). In other words, though I label it
“prejudice” in this chapter, SDO in fact taps the fundamental predisposition underly-
ing all the symbolic attitudes which have been found to correlate with protectionism in
various observational studies of trade preferences. In sum, SDO offers what is likely to
be the most basic, generalizable—and thus appropriate—measure of relevant symbolic
predispositions in the context of globalization opinion.
The latter point is also important for the eventual extension of this study and others
like it to contexts beyond the United States. As a measure of out-group aversion that is
not specific to any particular content or culture, SDO can serve as a consistent measure
of symbolic predispositions across cultures, countries, and contexts. Indeed, a recent
study of SDO in 15 languages and 20 countries shows that the measure is highly general
and cross-culturally robust (Pratto et al. 2012). The lion’s share of scholarship on
mass attitudes toward international trade and globalization focuses on the United States,
and studies that rigorously examine the impact of symbolic predispositions on trade
preferences outside the American context are especially scarce. The use of a generalizable
measure such as SDO can help facilitate greater cross-cultural research in this area.
In this study, I use a two-item SDO scale. After administering the treatment, mea-
suring the dependent variable, checking the manipulation, and collecting additional de-
mographic information, I asked respondents to express their degree of agreement or dis-
agreement with each of the following statements:
“In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.”
“We should not push for group equality.”
Response options spanned a five-point scale, ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly
disagree.” To construct a measure of SDO, I first code responses to each of these two
statements so that in each case, those favoring (opposing) group inequality have higher
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(lower) scores on a five-point scale. I then average the two scores, yielding a five-point
SDO variable. In the analysis that follows, those with an SDO score of “4” or “5” are
considered “prejudiced”. Clearly, this designation is not intended to be a judgment of their
character; it is simply a label identifying those who have especially negative attitudes
toward out-groups.
Finally, recall from Section 2.4.3 that the dependent variable in this study (i.e., pro-
tectionist trade sentiment) is derived from responses to the following question:
Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow
firms such as [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] to more freely sell
their goods in the United States?
Figure 2.3 outlines the experimental design and maps the order in which respondents
were exposed to the relevant stimuli and questions.8
Figure 2.3: Map of Experimental Procedure.
2.5 Results
Table 2.19 summarizes the estimated effect of a trading partner’s cultural foreignness on
protectionism. The left column presents the results from the analysis of all respondents,
8To address concerns that the treatment might somehow prime out-group attitudes, a series of un-
related demographic and knowledge questions precede the measurement of symbolic attitudes in this
experiment.
9The quantitative data used in this dissertation have been deposited at
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/25850
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while the right column presents the results for prejudiced respondents only.10
Table 2.1: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Protectionism.
All Respondents Prejudiced Respondents
Culturally Foreign 24.5 40.4
Culturally Familiar 24.4 22.1
Difference 0.099 18.3*
(95% Confidence Interval) (-5.3 to 5.5) (4.3 to 32.5)
p-value 0.971 0.011
Note: The table presents the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions when the
affected non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar. The difference is the
estimated effect of cultural distance, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. An asterisk indicates
an effect that is statistically significant at conventional levels. The sample sizes for the analysis of all
respondents were 493 for “Culturally Foreign” and 495 for “Culturally Familiar.” The corresponding
sample sizes for prejudiced respondents were 89 and 77.
The table shows the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions
when the affected (hypothetical) non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was
culturally familiar. While the level of trade opposition is virtually identical across treat-
ment groups in the general population, as predicted, cultural foreignness has a significant
effect on protectionism among the prejudiced. Approximately 22.1% of highly prejudiced
respondents opposed the easing of trade restrictions when the foreign firm was cultur-
ally familiar, versus 40.4% when the hypothetical firm was culturally foreign. Cultural
distance thus nearly doubled opposition to trade in this subgroup, increasing it by more
than 18 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 4.3 to 32.5. Clearly, this
effect is highly significant both statistically and substantively. The observed interaction
between prejudice and the cultural distance treatment provides strong evidence of the
independent causal effect of prejudice on protectionism. A visual summary of this result
is presented in Figure 2.4.
The manipulation check discussed in Section 2.4.3 confirms that the final distributions
10Since my primary concern here is assessing the effect of cultural distance, I pool over both economic
treatment conditions in the analysis that follows. Conditioning the results on the skill level of the
hypothetical firm’s labor input, however, yields results that are substantively similar.
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Figure 2.4: Experimental Treatment, Prejudice, and Protectionist Trade
Preferences.
of respondent beliefs about the origins of the two hypothetical firms are highly similar
across the general sample and the prejudiced subset.11 It is not the case, in other words,
that more highly prejudiced respondents were more likely to successfully receive the
treatment. The conditional treatment effect I report, therefore, is due to prejudice—it is
not due to differences in manipulation susceptibility across the two groups.
Relatedly, the effect of cultural distance should become amplified if we focus more
narrowly on those respondents who were identified (via the manipulation check) as having
received the treatment. I repeat the analysis presented above, but this time, I include
only those respondents who believed that Tuntyakore & Zideying (Gordon & Roberts)
is from a culturally foreign (familiar) country or part of the world. In the case of the
culturally foreign treatment group, I dropped from the analysis all those who associated
Tuntyakore & Zideying with North America, Western Europe, Australia, or New Zealand.
Conversely, in the case of the culturally familiar treatment, I dropped respondents who
associated Gordon & Roberts with anywhere but Western Europe (including the United
11For details, see Figures 1A and 2A in Appendix A.
24
Kingdom), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. I also excluded any
respondent who refused to answer the question about firm origin, or who answered the
question by saying that he either did not know or did not care. In total, 383 of the
original 988 respondents were dropped from the analysis of the general sample, while 70
of the original 166 subjects were dropped from the prejudiced subgroup.
Table 2.2 summarizes the results of this analysis. Once again, I present the percentage
of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions in each treatment group.
Table 2.2: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Protectionism,
Treatment Received.
Treatment Received
All Respondents Prejudiced Respondents
Culturally Foreign 25.6 44.4
Culturally Familiar 20.0 19.0
Difference 5.6 25.4*
(95% Confidence Interval) (-1.1 to 12.4) (6.6 to 44.1)
p-value 0.101 0.009
Note: The table presents the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions when the
affected non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar. The difference is the
estimated effect of cultural distance, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. An asterisk indicates
an effect that is statistically significant at conventional levels. The sample sizes for the analysis of all
respondents were 320 for “Culturally Foreign” and 285 for “Culturally Familiar.” The corresponding
sample sizes for prejudiced respondents were 54 and 42.
Both in the general sample and in the prejudiced subgroup, the magnitude of the
foreignness effect increases when I include only those who received the treatment: from
0.099 to 5.6 percentage points in the case of the former, and from 18.3 to 44.4 percent-
age points in the case of the latter. In this second analysis, in other words, cultural
distance more than doubles the level of protectionism among the prejudiced. The effect
remains highly significant statistically in this subgroup, but once again, does not attain
conventional levels of statistical significance in the general population.12
12Readers might observe the implication of these results for the non-prejudiced: among that subgroup,
cultural distance decreases opposition to trade. Indeed, when only those who received the treatment
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2.6 Robustness Checks
Readers might wonder whether the results of this study are sensitive to the wording of
its key survey instrument. Recall that after exposing subjects to the characteristics of
the hypothetical firm, I ask each respondent whether she would support or oppose re-
moving trade restriction which would allow firms “such as” either Tuntyakore & Zideying
or Gordon & Roberts to more freely sell their goods in the United States. Because it
does not explicitly specify that all firms affected by the potential trade policy share the
economic characteristics of Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts, the particular
wording of this question may lead different subjects to understand the economic impli-
cations of the proposed policy differently. Specifically, respondents might assume that
other firms affected by the potential trade policy have economic characteristics (i.e., a
low- or highly skilled workforce) that are more consistent with the overall workforce char-
acteristics of the hypothetical firm’s country of origin. In other words, one might worry
that the wording of the survey does not entirely rule out the possibility that the observed
increase in protectionism is driven by the assumed economic characteristics of Tuntykore
& Zideying’s home country, rather than by its cultural distance.
That the effect of cultural distance is conditional on prejudice makes it especially
unlikely that economic considerations are driving the results. Still, to address this con-
cern, I re-run the experiment on Mechanical Turk—first using the original version of the
question, and then employing two alternative wordings presented in Table 2.3. The alter-
nate versions explicitly preclude unintended economic interpretations of the treatment by
specifying (I) that all affected firms share the workforce characteristics of the hypothetical
firm, or (II) by removing the phrase “such as” from the question altogether.13
are included, cultural distance decreases protectionism by 4% among the non-prejudiced, although this
decrease is not close to attaining statistical significance at conventional levels (p = 0.846). When the
manipulation check is not used to narrow the sample, cultural distance leads to a 15% fall in opposition
to trade (p = 0.191). See Chapter 4 for an investigation of this phenomenon.
13Some readers might suggest that the aims of this robustness check could have been better achieved
by telling subjects explicitly that the net economic effect of the proposed trade policy is zero. However,
such a condition—under which all respondents assume no economic impact—would trivialize the observed
effect of cultural distance. What I am seeking to show is more significant—i.e., that cultural distance
has an effect when economic considerations are present, not that cultural factors matter when economic
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Table 2.3: Alternate Wordings of the Survey, Fielded on Mechanical Turk.
Alternate Version I “Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions
which would allow firms such as [Tuntyakore & Zidey-
ing/Gordon & Roberts] to more freely sell their goods in the
United States? (Note that all firms affected by such a policy
would be highly similar to [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon
& Roberts] in terms of their workforce characteristics.)”
Alternate Version II “Would you support or oppose removing trade restric-
tions which would allow [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon &
Roberts] to more freely sell its goods in the United States?”
All three versions of the survey fielded on MTurk yield consistent results, ruling out the
unlikely possibility that the results of this experiment are driven by the assumed economic
characteristics of the hypothetical firm’s home country. Indeed, in Alternate Version II,
cultural distance leads to a 146% increase in protectionism among the prejudiced.
The results reported in Section 2.5 are also robust to the exclusion of respondents
whose beliefs about the country origin of Tuntyakore & Zideying cluster around any one
geographic sub-region. In other words, the results are not driven by respondents who
identify the firm with any single part of the world. Readers might worry, for instance,
that the opposition to trade we observe among the prejudiced might dissipate if those
who associate the firm with East or South Asia are dropped from the analysis. This is not
the case. The results remain virtually unchanged when any one sub-region is excluded.
Furthermore, the results are not sensitive to the exclusion of all respondents who believe
Tuntyakore & Zideying to be from one of either China or India.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the first evidence of the independent causal effect of cultural
distance on trade preferences. I have argued from a theoretical perspective grounded in
consequences are completely absent.
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psychology that prejudice causes opposition to international trade, leading to the spe-
cific prediction that cultural distance from trading partners will increase protectionism
among the highly prejudiced. I then tested this proposition using a creative survey ex-
periment fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans. The results are
striking: among the prejudiced, cultural distance more than doubles opposition to inter-
national trade. This findings provides strong support for the causal priority of symbolic
predispositions in the formation of individual trade preferences.
The implications of this finding are substantial. Establishing the causal effect of prej-
udice on trade opinion not only resolves a particularly fundamental question in the study
of IPE, but it also advances the research agenda on the politics of trade more generally.
For example, my study sheds considerable light on the often puzzling public politics of
international trade. Economists have expressed surprise and dismay over the political pre-
sentation of globalization in emotionally charged and logically irrelevant terms (Krugman
1996; Mankiw and Swagel 2006). Indeed, a significant proportion of public communica-
tions about economic globalization—including pro-globalization messages—are designed
to activate symbolic predispositions such as prejudice and nationalism (Skonieczky 2001;
Luntz 2006; Mullainathan et al. 2008). But if symbolic predispositions are strong drivers
of mass attitudes in this area, then the economically irrelevant frames employed by po-
litical elites become expected rather than surprising.
In a context where trade agreements are increasingly made with specific countries or
regions, the causal effect of cultural distance on trade opinion has further important impli-
cations for politics and policy. Scholarship on trade opinion is overwhelmingly concerned
with preferences over trade in general, but polling data indicates that, in the United
States at least, the public’s support for trade varies substantially across trading partners
(Kohut et al. 2010). The findings of this chapter strongly suggest that this variation is
due to partners’ degree of cultural foreignness, not just their economic characteristics.
Support for the causal role of symbolic predispositions leaves students of globalization
much better equipped to investigate these underexplored contours of trade politics, as
well as their implications for policy.
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More generally, the success of this experimental design highlights the possibility of its
fruitful application to other issue-areas, including, but not limited to, other dimensions
of economic globalization. As research increasingly shows, international trade is not the
only global issue that provokes an affective response based on longstanding symbolic
predispositions such prejudice, nationalism, or attitudes toward foreignness (Baker and
Fitzgerald 2012; Kinder and Kam 2009; Mansfield and Mutz forthcoming). The type of
experimental manipulation I use in this study can likely be employed with great success
to investigate the effect of symbolic factors on voter attitudes in other policy domains.
Importantly, the design of this study has made it possible to cleanly isolate the effect
of cultural factors from that of material self-interest or other economic considerations, im-
plying a strong and independent effect for symbolic predispositions. Critics may counter
that even this study cannot rule out the possibility that economic interests are ultimately
responsible for the impact of symbolic attitudes on trade opinion: if prejudice is inherited
from parents or formed early in life, and if one’s family has benefited economically from
international trade, then the views expressed at home may very well be more favorable to
out-groups and those with whom we trade (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). It might be
argued that, in this way, the independence of prejudiced-based judgments from economic
interests remains questionable.
Admittedly, my study does not address the origins of prejudice and thus, cannot
imply absolute independence for its effect. But we must take care not to set the bar
unreasonably (or even unattainably) high, dismissing in the process truly significant gains
in our understanding of public opinion toward globalization. As Robert Keohane and Lisa
Martin wrote of the independent effect of international institutions years ago, “Institutions
are important ‘independently’ only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling
for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist” (Keohane and Martin
1995, p. 42). In this sense at least, this chapter clearly establishes that cultural factors
have an independent causal effect on public opinion toward international trade.
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Chapter 3
Feelings First: Non-Material Factors as
Moderators of Economic Self-Interest
Effects on Trade Preferences
3.1 Introduction
What explains individual attitudes toward trade policy? Studies of public opinion to-
ward international trade have identified a wide array of factors—both material and non-
material—as sources of individual trade preferences (e.g., Baker 2005; Beaulieu 2002;
Dong et al. 2013; Guisinger 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Jamal and Milner 2013;
Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013; Lindsey and Lake 2013; Mans-
field and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001;
Rankin 2001; Rathbun forthcoming; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Most of these factors,
however, can be grouped into two broad categories. The first follows from conventional
models of political economy and includes objective indicators of material self-interest with
respect to trade, such as an individual’s skill level or industry of employment (Alt et al.
1996). The second category comprises a cluster of non-material attitudes that reflect cul-
tural identity or symbolic predispositions of some kind (e.g., nationalism, ethnocentrism,
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prejudice, cosmopolitanism, etc.). Taken collectively, existing studies of survey data have
shown that both material and symbolic factors affect trade preferences, with some argu-
ing, more radically, that material self-interest plays no role in shaping attitudes toward
trade (Dong et al. 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Indeed, one of the central debates
in the extant literature—and in international political economy more broadly—pits these
two categories of variables against one another as sources of public opinion (Fordham and
Kleinberg 2012).
Studies of trade opinion generally take a uniform approach to this debate: they focus
on the average individual and report how much or how little economic and non-economic
factors affect preferences over trade. The micro-foundations of preference formation—the
particular role of these two types of factors, and their relationship to one another—have
not yet been theorized or investigated empirically. This chapter takes a substantial step
in that direction. I build a theoretical framework informed by psychology to illuminate,
and ultimately break, the dichotomous “material versus non-material” debate that has
come to characterize this area of study.
Using new data from a survey of over 4,000 American workers and focusing on industry
of employment as an indicator of objective material self-interest, I demonstrate that senti-
ment toward foreign cultural influences—a symbolic, non-material factor—enjoys priority
over economic self-interest in the formation of public opinion toward international trade.
I do not simply argue that these cultural attitudes are a stronger predictor of individual
trade preferences relative to sector of employment. Rather, I show that the strength
of one’s symbolic attitudes conditions the effect of the conventional economic variable.
Specifically, only when attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are weak or neutral1
do the considerations of material self-interest associated with industry of employment
have any effect on trade opinion. When such attitudes are strong in either direction,
whether positive or negative—i.e., when an individual deviates from a neutral position
on the symbolic attitudes scale—the effect of economic self-interest fades completely.
1In this chapter, the terms “weak” and “neutral” are both used to characterize the symbolic attitudes
of an individual who, on a given attitudinal scale, does not feel particularly strongly in either direction.
This characterization is defined more precisely in my discussion of the data below.
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The implications of this finding are striking: symbolic attitudes and industry effects do
not reinforce or counterbalance each other in this context; rather, material self-interest is
a “second order” consideration that acquires salience only when strong sentiments toward
foreign cultural influences are lacking. Consistent with theories of preference formation in
psychology, my findings suggest that symbolic attitudes enjoy a higher level of priority in
the formation of trade preferences: they are “first order” factors that can altogether trump
the contribution of economic self-interest to an individual’s position on international
trade. Put differently, I show that non-material factors define the scope conditions for
longstanding models of trade preferences based on rational economic self-interest.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. I begin by presenting the
theoretical foundation of my argument, building upon the notion of heuristic judgment
from behavioral economics and the theory of symbolic politics from political psychology. I
advance a theoretical framework that accounts for both material and symbolic factors, and
importantly, specifies the relationship between the two. In Section 3.3, I turn to the data
and describe the dependent and independent variables of interest in this study. Section
3.4 presents the results of my statistical analysis. First, I follow the approach prevalent
among existing studies of public opinion in IPE and analyze the sample as a whole. I show
that, while attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are generally stronger predictors
of individual trade preferences, objective material self-interest, captured by industry of
employment, matters greatly as well. Second, I turn to the heart of my argument: I use
split sample and interaction analysis to establish the priority of cultural attitudes over
industry-based economic considerations in the formation of trade preferences. Section 3.5
considers the robustness of my findings, while Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 From Affect to Opinion: Trade Preferences and
the Theory of Symbolic Politics
Rationality, as a cognitive process, can be very demanding. As research in social psy-
chology indicates, the mind relies on shortcuts wherever possible to avoid the effortful
mental work of conscious and deliberate reasoning. This idea is famously articulated by
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Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who argued in their Nobel prize-winning work that
individuals use “heuristics”2 to simplify complex decisions into quick, intuitive judgments
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Such heuristics are not consciously chosen. Rather, they
are part of a “mental shotgun” whereby the mind instinctively evades the demanding work
of complex reasoning by substituting an easier question for a difficult one—typically with-
out noticing the substitution (Kahneman 2011).
One of the most commonly used intuitive heuristics in decision making involves re-
liance on emotion or affect (Kahneman 2011; Sears 2001).3 The notion of affective judg-
ment was introduced into the heuristics lexicon by psychologist Paul Slovic as an affect
heuristic (Slovic et al. 2002). Building on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, Slovic
observed a process of decision making in which judgments are guided directly by reflexive
gut feelings of liking and disliking, without deliberation or reasoning. The affect heuristic,
in other words, is an instance of substitution where the answer to an easy question (How
do I feel about it?) serves subconsciously as an answer to a much harder question (What
do I think about it?).
The world of politics is not immune to the shortcuts of the human mind. In the realm
of political preference formation, the notion of judgment through affective response finds
prominent expression in the theory of symbolic politics. According to this theory, peo-
ple acquire early in life a set of broad and highly stable “symbolic” predispositions (e.g.,
prejudice, nationalism, political ideology) which drives their attitudes toward particular
political issues in adulthood (Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980).4 Importantly, sym-
bolic predispositions drive political preferences by way of the affective shortcuts discussed
above. Later in life, as an individual is confronted with new and unfamiliar policy issues,
the symbols posed by those issues evoke habitual and highly affective responses based
on the person’s longstanding symbolic attitudes. As Sears et al. explained when they
introduced the theory in the late 1970s, the political symbols posed by issues such as “in-
2The technical definition of heuristic is “a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often
imperfect, answers to difficult questions” (Kahneman 2011).
3I follow Neuman et al. (2007) and use the terms “emotion” and “affect” interchangeably.
4The terms “symbolic attitudes” and “symbolic predispositions” are also used interchangeably in this
chapter.
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tegration” and “affirmative action,” for example, evoke habitual and emotional responses
based on underlying predispositions such as racial tolerance or prejudice (1979). More
recently, it has been shown that racial attitudes are an important driver of public opinion
toward health care reform policy in the United States (Tesler 2012). The policy—widely
known as “Obamacare”—is closely associated with an African American President, and
thus, as a policy issue, it evokes an automatic gut reaction rooted in attitudes toward
race.
The theory of symbolic politics therefore implies a distinctive mode of information pro-
cessing which proceeds by way of strong affective responses to political symbols. In the
arena of mass politics, then, strong symbolic predispositions make possible the cognitive
shortcut of judgment via affect: when the relevant predispositions are sufficiently strong,
the gut feelings evoked by political issues direct preferences, making a demanding cogni-
tive process unnecessary. Individual preferences toward political issues are thus “formed
mainly in congruence with longstanding values about society and the polity, rather than
short-term instrumentalities for the satisfaction of one’s current private needs” (Sears et
al. 1980, p.671).
In the American context, this has been shown to be the case across a variety of issue-
areas (Lau and Heldman 2009; Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980; Tesler and Sears
2009; Tesler 2012). My claim is that, for the majority of individuals, international trade
is no exception. The theory of symbolic politics suggests that the symbols associated
with trade—it represents a transaction with a “foreign other,” for instance—evoke an
affective response based on general and stable symbolic predispositions such as attitudes
toward out-groups or foreignness. To put it in the language of heuristics, the difficult
and complex question —“What do I think about trade?”—is displaced by the much easier
question: “How do I feel about it?”
Importantly, symbolic attitudes evoke responses which are spontaneous rather than
deliberate, automatic rather than intentional or voluntary, and of course, highly affective
rather than cognitive (Sears 1993). They are, in other words, “primary” and “basic,” in-
dependent of prior cognitive appraisals (Sears 1993; Zajonc 1980). According to a model
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of trade preferences informed by psychology, then, symbolic predispositions enjoy a po-
sition of priority. Among those with strong symbolic attitudes toward foreign cultural
influences (i.e., those most likely to react with an automatic, emotional response to the
political issue of international trade), preferences should be unaffected by the rational
calculus of self-interest. When the relevant symbolic predispositions are strong, the sym-
bolic meaning of international trade as a political attitude object evokes an emotional,
gut-level response that renders a cognitive appraisal unnecessary. In other words, an
affect heuristic is readily available and the simplifying substitution is made.
When strong symbolic predispositions are lacking, on the other hand, the theory of
symbolic politics expects that other—likely rational—considerations will come into play.
For example, in a recent study of racial predispositions and vote choice in the 2008
American presidential election, Tesler and Sears conclude that unlike racial liberals and
racial conservatives, racial “moderates”—those who are neither especially sympathetic
nor especially unsympathetic toward blacks—voted according to the prevailing short-
term forces of the election year (e.g., an evaluation of economic conditions, disapproval
of Bush’s Iraq policy) and thus, helped offset Obama’s poor performance among racial
conservatives (2009). The implication for attitudes toward international trade is clear:
rational considerations should affect only those who are neither cultural xenophobes nor
cosmopolitans. In other words, only when symbolic attitudes are neutral do I expect to
observe self-interest effects on individual trade preferences.5
3.3 Data
The data I use in this study comes from a survey administered by the Harvard Global-
ization Survey (HGS) Project to measure attitudes toward global economic integration
5Although the theory I present here is novel in its application to international political economy at
the micro level, a similar argument is made at the macro level by Rawi Abdelal in his study of economic
policy in three post-Soviet states (2001). Interestingly, Abdelal argues that in the absence of a strong
national identity (i.e., when the national identity of a society is ambiguous and ambivalent), governments
are likely to respond to short-term material incentives, falling back on the pursuit of economic goals such
as the maximization of societal wealth and economic consumption. When national identity is strong
and uncontested, on the other hand, a country’s economic policy is defined and directly guided by social
purpose, with economic goals linked to the protection and cultivation of the nation.
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among a sample of over 4,000 U.S. workers from selected industries. The survey design
followed a customized two-stage sampling approach in which first, a set of 12 key in-
dustries (five in manufacturing, the rest in services) were identified based on a number
criteria reflecting variation in exposure to the impacts of globalization (i.e., factor inten-
sity, value-added per worker, trade balance, exposure to offshoring activity, dependence
on immigrant labor, and total employment). The 12 industries included in the sample
were chosen to provide suitably wide variation along these dimensions of interest and
to cover the whole range of industries along them.6 Once the targeted industries were
identified, a sizeable sample of currently employed, native workers was recruited from
each. The sample sizes obtained for each sector are roughly proportional to the size of
that industry. The survey was fielded online by YouGov/Polimetrix between September
2010 and February 2011.
3.3.1 Dependent Variables
As measures of individual attitudes toward international trade, I rely on responses to
three separate questions on the HGS survey:
We would like to learn about your views on trade with other countries - by trade we
mean American business and individuals buying goods from other countries or selling
goods to other countries.
1. Do you think that restrictions on buying goods made in other countries should be
increased, decreased, or kept at the current level?
2. Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for you and your family?
3. Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for the United States as
a whole?
6The manufacturing industries include: food manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, computer and
electronic product manufacturing, transportation equipment manufacturing, and fabricated metal prod-
uct manufacturing. The service industries are: construction, telecommunications, educational services,
ambulatory health care services, nursing and residential care, financial services, and internet and data
processing services.
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In the case of the first question, response options reflect a five-point scale ranging from
“Increase greatly” to “Decrease greatly.” I use responses to this item to code the first of
my dependent variables, a binary indicator of protectionism which takes a value of 1 for
respondents who think that restrictions on trade should be greatly or somewhat increased,
and 0 otherwise. Answer categories for the second two questions also span a five-point
scale, this time ranging from “Very good” to “Very bad.” I construct two further binary
dependent variables, each corresponding to one of these two questions. These indicators
take a value of 1 for respondents who believe trade is very bad or somewhat bad for
themselves (or the United States), and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variables in this analysis, therefore, are binary measures of (I) support
for restrictions on buying goods made in other countries (Tariff Support), (II) the per-
ception of trade’s impact (good or bad) on one’s self and family (Bad Self Impact), and
(III) the perception of trade’s impact (good or bad) on the United States as a whole (Bad
US Impact). Notice that only the first of these variables is based on a direct measure
of individual attitudes toward trade policy. The second two variables reflect individual
beliefs about trade’s personal or country-level impact. While I am ultimately interested
in preferences toward policy, I believe that treating such beliefs as dependent variables
is very useful in the context of this study for at least two reasons. First, and most
importantly, beliefs about trade’s personal and country-level impacts are very strongly
associated with individual policy preferences, both in this data and in other surveys of
trade opinion (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). Thus, the fac-
tors driving these beliefs are also very likely to be indirectly affecting opinion toward
trade policy. Second, one could reasonably suggest that where perceptions of trade’s im-
pact on self and family are concerned, considerations of material self-interest should play
a particularly strong role. Treating perceptions of personal impact as a dependent vari-
able, therefore, sets up a particularly difficult test for the role and effect of non-material
factors in the process of trade preference formation.
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3.3.2 Independent Variables
The HGS survey provides an especially good measure of anti-foreign sentiment with the
following question:
People have different views on whether exposure to cultural influence from other
countries is positive or negative for American society. In your view, what is the
impact of foreign cultural influences on American society?
This question offered respondents five answer categories, ranging from “Very positive” to
“Very negative.”
The instrument used by the HGS survey to gauge pro- or anti-foreign sentiment is
especially perfect given the aims of this chapter. First, and most importantly, respondents
have the option of expressing a weak or neutral stance toward foreign cultural influences:
in response to the above question, individuals can answer “Neither positive nor negative,”
indicating a moderate position on this attitudinal scale. Second, notice that the question
is concerned with cultural foreign influences; it says nothing about economic or even
political interaction with foreigners. In an open-ended follow-up question, respondents
who attributed a negative impact to foreign cultural influences were asked to specify the
cultural threats with which they are concerned. Not a single respondent voiced economic
or economic-related concerns.
Finally, unlike some other indicators of symbolic or identity-related attitudes which
have been employed in studies of trade preferences, the HGS measure reflects a more re-
alistic conception of identity by allowing cosmopolitan attitudes to coexist with a modest
level of national or in-group pride. Consider, for instance, a measure of nationalism that
asks respondents whether they would rather be a citizen of their own country over any
other country in the world (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Rankin
2001). Such a question does not allow for a clean separation of genuine cultural xeno-
phobia from a type of tempered patriotism which can comfortably coexist with a strong
cosmopolitan orientation. We can easily imagine an individual, for example, who holds
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positive attitudes toward foreign cultures and influences, who does not believe that his
country is necessarily “better” than other countries in the world, but who is, nonetheless,
a proud citizen with no desire to exchange his citizenship.
Given the particular design of this study, and my argument that the effect of material
self-interest depends upon neutral symbolic attitudes, a related problem arises when the
measure of these attitudes cannot distinguish individuals who hold a neutral stance from
those who hold a positive one. The measure of ethnocentrism7 employed by Mansfield
and Mutz’s study of trade preferences (2009) demonstrates this point. The measure is
obtained by asking an individual about some positive and some negative human character-
istics with reference to her (racial/ethnic) in-group as well as her out-groups. Specifically,
ethnocentrism is the difference between the mean for positive-negative characteristic at-
tributed to the in-group and the same characteristics attributed to the out-group.8
This particular and widely used measure of ethnocentrism enables easy identification
of the prejudiced and xenophobic. It makes it especially hard, however, to distinguish
between those who hold genuinely positive attitudes toward out-groups and those who
are neutral. How should we classify those who obtain a score of (roughly) zero on the eth-
nocentrism scale, indicating that they view members of out-groups as equal to members
of their own group? Are such individuals “positives” or “neutrals”? Recall that obtaining
a less-than-zero (on my definition, “positive”) score on the ethnocentrism scale indicates a
bias against one’s own group—a bias we cannot expect to necessarily observe even among
those who have strong cosmopolitan outlook.
The question posed on the HGS survey about the impact of foreign cultural influences
thus lends itself particularly well to the design and aims of this chapter. It makes it possi-
ble to cleanly distinguish prejudice and xenophobia from moderate patriotism, and offers
reliable distinctions between those who hold negative, neutral, and positive sentiments
7In this context, ethnocentrism refers to the tendency to think less of those who are racially or
ethnically different from one’s own group
8For example, respondents are asked: “Next are some questions about various groups in our society.
Below are seven-point scales on which you can rate characteristics of people in different groups. Where
would you rate [BLACKS/WHITES/HISPANIC-AMERICANS] on these scales?” The scales repre-
sent positive-negative characteristics including Hard-Working-Lazy, Efficient-Wasteful, and Trustworthy-
Untrustworthy.
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toward foreignness. From responses to this question, I construct Cultural Sentiment, a
three-point measure of attitudes toward foreign cultural influences, where positive equals
1, neutral equals 2, and negative equals 3.9
To capture the material self-interest implications of individuals’ industry of employ-
ment,10 I construct Import Industry, a dummy variable that is coded according to the
net trade balance of a respondent’s sector of employment.11 Respondents employed in
industries with a negative trade balance are coded as 1, while all others are coded as
0.12 With respect to attitudes toward trade, there is no detectable difference between
those working in export-oriented industries and those working in non-tradables; I have
therefore kept the variable binary. Industry classifications are according to three-digit
North American Industry Classification System codes, which is standard in the literature
on trade preferences.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Whole Sample Analysis
To begin, I take the approach that is prevalent among existing studies of trade opinion
and analyze the sample as a whole. I estimate a logit model for each of my three depen-
dent variables, including Cultural Sentiment as the measure of symbolic attitudes and
Import Industry as an indicator of economic self-interest. For each case, first differences
associated with changes in cultural attitudes and industry of employment are reported in
Table 3.1.13 These results demonstrate two points. First, both material and non-material
9In this data, roughly 53% of respondents are “positives,” 28% are “neutrals,” and the remaining 19%
are “negatives.”
10According the Ricardo-Viner model, in which one (or more) of the factors of production is assumed
to be “specific” or immobile between industries, economic returns to factors of production are tied closely
to the fortunes of the industry in which they are employed. Thus, those employed in import-competing
sectors are expected to suffer a real decrease in returns as a result of trade (Jones 1971).
11Industry trade balances are calculated from 2010 data on U.S. imports and exports (United States
International Trade Commission 2010).
12Recall from the beginning of this section that the sample was drawn from 12 targeted industries.
13Full regression tables for all the analysis presented in this chapter are included in Appendix B.
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factors play an important role, on average, in the formation of individual preferences over
trade. With the exception of Model 2, where Bad US Impact is the dependent variable,
both cultural xenophobia and employment in an industry with a negative trade balance
are significant predictors of negative trade-related attitudes. For example, and as reported
in Table 3.2, a move from positive to negative on the three-point Cultural Sentiment scale
increases the predicted probability of tariff support by 27.2%, while employment in an
import industry represents a 22.2% increase in that probability.
Table 3.1: Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Protectionism (DV=1),
Whole Sample.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV=Bad Self Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Cultural Sentiment 0.183 0.237 0.091
(positive to negative) (0.145, 0.224) (0.194, 0.280) (0.047, 0.138)
Import Industry 0.042 0.026 0.077
(0 to 1) (0.013, 0.077) (-0.004, 0.058) (0.037, 0.116)
Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Models include a full set of baseline covariates (i.e.,
gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge). In the analysis
above, these other variables are held at their means.
Table 3.2: Percentage Increases in the Predicted Probabilities of
Protectionism (DV=1), Whole Sample.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV=Bad Self Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Cultural Sentiment +147.6% +173.0% +27.2%
(positive to negative) (from 0.124 to 0.307) (from 0.137 to 0.374) (from 0.334 to 0.425)
Import Industry +25.9% +13.6% +22.2%
(0 to 1) (from 0.162 to 0.204) (from 0.191 to 0.217) (from 0.346 to 0.423)
Note: Models include a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership,
education, income, and economic knowledge). In the analysis above, these other variables are held at
their means.
Second, and looking across the three dependent variables, the impact of cultural
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attitudes on trade opinion appears to be stronger than industry effects—in most cases,
overwhelmingly so. For instance, respondents who hold negative attitudes toward foreign
cultural influences are one and a half times more likely than those with positive cultural
attitudes to believe that trade is bad for them and their family. A change from 0 to 1 on
the Import Industry indicator, on the other hand, results in only a 26% increase in the
probability of believing that trade is bad for one’s self and family.
My analysis thus far has confirmed that, on average, both material and non-material
factors “matter,” and that symbolic factors are generally dominant predictors of trade-
related opinion. The preceding results, however, tell us little else about the micro-
foundations of public opinion with respect to trade. In the sub-sections that follow, I
advance the limits of scholarship on this front by taking a novel approach to the data.
3.4.2 Split Sample Analysis
My argument is that symbolic predispositions enjoy a higher level of priority in the
formation of preferences: they are first order factors that moderate the impact of indus-
try considerations on an individual’s position toward international trade. Specifically,
I hypothesize that the effect of material self-interest (in this case, the effect of Import
Industry) depends upon the strength of cultural attitudes: only when attitudes toward
foreign cultural influences are weak do the material self-interest considerations associated
with industry of employment have any effect on preferences over trade.
To test this proposition, I first conduct a split sample analysis of the data. I divide
the data into three according to the value of Cultural Sentiment and, in each sub-sample,
separately regress my three measures of trade attitudes on Import Industry and the set of
baseline covariates. I expect to observe strong industry effects on the outcome variables in
the neutral group, but not in the sub-samples comprising individuals with either negative
or positive attitudes toward foreign cultural influences. The results, presented in Tables
3.3-3.5 are striking.
In the case of all three dependent variables—Bad Self Impact, Bad US Impact, and
Tariff Support—the logit coefficient on Import Industry is highly significant statistically
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Table 3.3: Effect of industry on Bad Self Impact by value of Cultural
Sentiment.
Value of Cultural Sentiment Coefficient on Import Industry p-value Observations
Positive 0.234 (-0.108, 0.577) 0.179 1995
Neutral 0.607 (0.267, 0.947) 0.000 1040
Negative -0.099 (-0.485, 0.288) 0.616 703
Note: Logit coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row provides
the estimate of the logit coefficient obtained from a separate regression of Bad Self Impact on Import
Industry and a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education,
income, and economic knowledge).
Table 3.4: Effect of industry on Bad US Impact by value of Cultural
Sentiment.
Value of Cultural Sentiment Coefficient on Import Industry p-value Observations
Positive 0.067 (-0.266, 0.400) 0.694 1994
Neutral 0.538 (0.203, 0.874) 0.002 1044
Negative -0.190 (-0.570, 0.190) 0.327 703
Note: Logit coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row provides the
estimate of the logit coefficient obtained from a separate regression of Bad US Impact on Import Industry
and a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income,
and economic knowledge).
Table 3.5: Effect of industry on Tariff Support by value of Cultural Sentiment.
Value of Cultural Sentiment Coefficient on Import Industry p-value Observations
Positive 0.223 (-0.012, 0.459) 0.063 1994
Neutral 0.516 (0.213, 0.819) 0.001 1044
Negative 0.284 (-0.072, 0.640) 0.118 704
Note: Logit coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row provides the
estimate of the logit coefficient obtained from a separate regression of Tariff Support on Import Industry
and a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income,
and economic knowledge).
in the neutral group, but does not attain conventional levels of significance in either
the positive or negative sub-samples. Moreover, when beliefs about trade’s personal
and country-level impact are the outcome variables, the coefficient estimate on Import
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Industry takes the wrong (i.e., negative) sign for those on the negative end of the Cultural
Sentiment scale.
To provide a more intuitive sense of these results, Figures 3.1-3.3 graphically present,
as a function of Cultural Sentiment, the change in the predicted probability of each
dependent variable equaling 1 (i.e., the probability of protectionism) when the value of
Import Industry moves from 0 to 1. The vertical lines denote the 95% confidence intervals
for each point estimate, and all other variables are held at their means.
Figure 3.1: Change in Predicted Probability of Bad Self Impact=1, Changing
Import Industry from 0 to 1.
Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.
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Figure 3.2: Change in Predicted Probability of Bad US Impact=1, Changing
Import Industry from 0 to 1.
Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.
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Figure 3.3: Change in Predicted Probability of Tariff Support=1, Changing
Import Industry from 0 to 1.
Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.
Note that in the case of all three outcome variables, the confidence interval on the
estimated change in the predicted probability of protectionism crosses zero when Cultural
Sentiment is either positive or negative. In sharp contrast, employment in an import-
competing sector substantially increases the probability of holding negative attitudes
toward international trade in the neutral category. Among neutrals, a change from 0 to
1 on the Import Industry indicator results in a 36% increase in the probability of tariff
support (from 0.337 to 0.460), a 49% increase in the probability of believing that trade
is bad for the country as a whole (from 0.222 to 0.333), and a 57% increase (from 0.195
to 0.307) in the probability of viewing trade as bad for one’s self and family.
3.4.3 Interaction Analysis
Next, to check the robustness of the preceding results, I return to the sample in its en-
tirety and jointly test the conditional relationship suggested above by interacting cultural
attitudes with Import Industry. As Figures 3.1-3.3 clearly demonstrate, the conditional
relationship I am positing is not a linear one: when the cultural variable takes its middle
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value of 2 (i.e., neutral), the import dummy has a strong effect on trade opinion; this is
not the case, however, when Cultural Sentiment takes its extreme values of 1 (positive)
or 3 (negative). A straight interaction of the two variables would thus not capture the
relationship. To take this non-linearity into account, I transform the three-point Cultural
Sentiment variable into a Neutral Sentiment dummy, where Neutral Sentiment equals 1
when Cultural Sentiment is neutral, and 0 otherwise. I then interact the import dummy
with this new variable to obtain Import Industry* Neutral Sentiment.
My particular coding of Neutral Sentiment means that, for the purpose of this analysis,
I treat those with positive and negative cultural attitudes as equivalent. I believe this to
be a defensible decision: the split sample results presented above show that the effect of
Import Industry fades dramatically as cultural attitudes deviate from neutral in either
direction. It is thus very unlikely that observations from only one of the extremes could
drive the interaction I am testing. Table 3.6 presents the results of the interaction analysis.
Table 3.6: Interaction between Import Industry and Neutral Sentiment.
DV=Bad Self Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Import Industry 0.119 0.002 0.250
(p=0.342) (p=0.985) (p=0.011)
Neutral Sentiment 0.045 -0.008 -0.064
(p=0.688) (p=0.942) (p=0.481)
Import Industry* 0.470 0.500 0.267
Neutral Sentiment (p=0.024) (p=0.014) (p=0.130)
Note: Logit coefficients are shown with p-values in parentheses. A full set of baseline covariates (i.e.,
gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge) was included.
The analysis confirms that, at least where perceptions of trade’s impact on self and
country are concerned, the effect of industry is conditional upon neutral attitudes toward
foreign cultural in influences. As Table 3.6 shows, when the dependent variable is Bad
Self Impact or Bad US Impact, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term carry
p-values smaller than 0.05.
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3.5 Further Robustness Checks and Alternative
Interpretations
How do we know that symbolic attitudes are in fact primary? I have demonstrated that
the strength of cultural attitudes conditions the effect of industry-based self-interest on
individual trade preferences, but to establish that symbolic attitudes are truly primary, I
must show that the reverse conditional relationship does not also hold. Might it be that
when economic self-interest is strong (i.e., when one works in an industry threatened by
imports), the effect of cultural sentiment on trade opinion also dissipates?
Notice that, conveniently, this reverse conditional relationship would not be charac-
terized by a corresponding non-linearity: the effect of cultural attitudes on trade opinion
would simply vary as we move from those employed in import-competing industries to
those who do not. Therefore, to test this potential conditional relationship, an inter-
action of the import dummy with the original three-point Cultural Sentiment variable
is the appropriate one. I thus interact Import Industry with Cultural Sentiment to get
Import Industry*Cultural Sentiment. Interaction analysis using this new term confirms
that the reverse conditional relationship does not hold. The coefficient on the interaction
term is not statistically significant for any of the three outcome variables, ruling out the
possibility that the effect of cultural attitudes depends upon the value of the economic
self-interest measure.
To further confirm the priority of symbolic attitudes, I perform reverse split sample
analysis, this time dividing the data according to the value of Import Industry (i.e.,
import-competing or not) in order to test whether the effect of cultural attitudes on trade
opinion is markedly weaker—or in fact, non-existent—among those with strong economic
interests. The results again provide a sharp contrast to the split sample analysis presented
earlier. For all three dependent variables, the impact of symbolic attitudes on trade
opinion is statistically significant (p-values ≤ 0.01) in both the import-competing and
non-import-competing sub-samples, with comparable substantive effects across the two
groups. In fact, and as shown in Figure 3.4, when Tariff Support is the dependent variable,
the estimated impact of negative cultural attitudes on the probability of protectionism is
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greater among those who work in import-competing industries versus those who do not.
Figure 3.4: Change in Predicted Probability of Tariff Support=1, Changing
Cultural Sentiment from 1 to 3.
Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.
Alternatively, it might be argued that some other characteristic distinguishing the
neutral group from both the positive and negative groups (i.e., something other than
neutral symbolic attitudes) is driving the main results of this chapter. Could it be, for
instance, that the results I present in the preceding sections indicate, not that symbolic
factors enjoy priority over self-interest considerations, but rather, that individuals in
the neutral group are better equipped to identify their material self-interest relative to
those in the positive or negative groups? For example, it might be true that neutrals
are, on average, better informed or more knowledgeable than their positive or negative
counterparts. Figures 3.5-3.8, however, clearly demonstrate that this is not the case.
By a variety of measures—frequency of news consumption, interest in news, economic
knowledge, and education—positives and negatives are at least as equally informed, and
in most cases significantly more informed, than individuals in the neutral group.
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Figure 3.5: Mean Weekly Frequency of Reading, Watching, or Listening to
News by Value of Cultural Sentiment.
Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3.6: Mean Measure of Interest in News by Value of Cultural Sentiment.
Note: Interest in news and public affairs as reported by respondents on a four-point scale. Vertical lines
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.7: Mean Measure of Economic Knowledge by Value of Cultural
Sentiment.
Note: Economic knowledge was measured with a multiple choice question which asked respondents:
“What must the government do to reduce high inflation?” Vertical lines represent 95% confidence inter-
vals.
Figure 3.8: Mean of Education by Value of Cultural Sentiment
Note: Education was measured on a six-point scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 3.7: Standardized Differences†of Covariate Means Across Neutral and
Positive/Negative Groups.
Standardized Difference of Means
Baseline Characteristics Positive vs. Neutral Groups Negative vs. Neutral Groups
Import-Competing -0.079 0.051
Female 0.031 0.208
Union Member 0.006 -0.016
Republican (vs. other) -0.379 0.184
White (vs. other) 0.016 0.102
Education 0.612 0.035
†Standardized difference = difference in means or proportions divided by standard error, with imbalance
defined as absolute value greater than 0.20.
Nor does it appear to be the case that there is some other covariate imbalance between
the neutral group and both of the other two categories. Table 3.7 shows that even when
there is an imbalance between the neutral group and another category (in the case of
education, for example), the imbalance exists only in one direction: we do not observe
any imbalance between both the neutral and positive categories, and the neutral and
negative ones. This casts serious doubt on the possibility that neutrals are somehow
distinct from their negative and positive counterparts in some other way that could make
their trade preferences more susceptible to the impact of industry.
Finally, one might be concerned about differences in the variance of the outcome
variables across the subgroups. Specifically, if there is little variance on the trade opinion
variables in the positive and negative groups versus in the neutral one, we might worry
that this is why the effect of industry is picked up only in the neutral category. We do
not, however, observe differences of this kind for any of the dependent variables.
Another set of concerns might stem from the possibility that the self-interested pref-
erences expressed by neutrals are also driven by cognitive shortcuts and automatic gut
responses. I have argued that rational self-interest considerations become salient when
strong symbolic attitudes—and the resulting affective shortcuts—are unavailable in the
context of trade. One could counter, however, that an economically self-interested posi-
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tion on trade might also be the product of some cognitive shortcut. Most notably, the
cue-based heuristic provided by the policy position of one’s trade union has been sug-
gested as an obvious possibility (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). But closer analysis of the data
dispels these concerns, at least insofar as cues from union groups are concerned. Those
who work in import-competing industries are no more likely to be unionized. Among
unionized workers, those who work in import-competing sectors are no more likely to
know their union’s stance on trade, to perceive their union’s stance to be protectionist,
or to receive anti-trade messages from their union.
To further test the robustness of this study’s findings, I repeat the analysis of Section
3.4 using a continuous measure of import penetration rather than the binary variable
Import Industry. To construct this continuous measure, ImportCont, I take the natural
logarithm of Mi/Yi where Mi is the volume of imports in sector i and Yi is the sector’s
total output. Since the non-tradables industries in my sample do not import goods,
and the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, I follow Mansfield and Mutz (2009) and
arbitrarily add 0.01 to Mi. Once again, I divide the data into three according to the value
of Cultural Sentiment and, in each sub-sample, separately regress my three measures
of trade attitudes on ImportCont and the set of baseline covariates. In the case of
all three dependent variables, the logit coefficient on ImportCont is substantively large
and highly significant statistically in the neutral group (p-value ≤ 0.002), but does not
attain conventional levels of significance in either the positive or negative sub-samples.
The results of the interaction analysis using a continuous rather than binary measure
of import competition also reflect the main findings of this chapter: in the two models
where beliefs about trade’s personal and country-level impact are the dependent variables,
the coefficient estimates on the interaction term ImportCont*Neutral Sentiment carry p-
values smaller than 0.008.
Substituting a five-point measure of Cultural Sentiment for the three-point measure I
use in the original analysis also has no bearing on the overall results. Recall that I collapse
a five-point attitudinal scale into three categories: those who respond that foreign cultural
influences are either “very” or “somewhat” positive (negative) for the United States are
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coded as positives (negatives) and treated as equal in the analysis. I make this decision
largely to avoid putting undue weight on potentially very subjective differences between
those within the positive or negative category. Conducting the split sample analysis on
five rather than three categories, however, yields results that mirror my original findings.
Lastly, it might be the case that symbolic predispositions and industry of employment
are not independent. We can imagine cultural xenophobes, for instance, avoiding employ-
ment in sectors that are exposed to globalization. If an individual’s choice of industry is
endogenous to her attitude toward foreign cultures, then my findings become susceptible
to yet another alternative interpretation: we may not observe independent industry ef-
fects among those with strong cultural attitudes because the choice of industry is itself
somehow driven by those symbolic attitudes. I find, however, that the distribution of
industry is virtually identical across the three categories of Cultural Sentiment, and that
cultural attitudes and Import Industry are not correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.053). This
finding also undermines the possibility of the reverse relationship between industry and
cultural attitudes14—i.e. cultural sentiment as a function of economic interest. Indeed,
this is consistent with the results of the experimental study presented in Chapter 2.
3.6 Conclusion
Taken together, my findings provide strong support for the conclusion that symbolic
factors enjoy priority over economic self-interest in the formation of public opinion to-
ward international trade. I show that the effect of industry—a key measure of mate-
rial self-interest in longstanding political economy models of trade—is conditional upon
the strength of an individual’s attitude toward foreign cultures. Specifically, only when
attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are weak do considerations of material self-
interest associated with industry of employment have any effect on trade opinion. When
such attitudes are strong in either direction, whether positive or negative (i.e., when an
14The accumulated wisdom of political psychology would predict this reverse relationship to be highly
unlikely: it is empirically well-established and widely accepted that broad symbolic predispositions form
early in life and remain highly stable throughout (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002).
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individual deviates from a neutral stance on the cultural attitudes scale), the effect of
economic self-interest fades completely.
The implications of these findings are significant: cultural attitudes and industry
effects do not reinforce or counterbalance each other in this context; rather, material self-
interest is a second order consideration that acquires salience only when strong symbolic
attitudes are lacking. My findings suggest, in other words, that the affective sources
of trade opinion associated with identities, values, and symbolic predispositions enjoy
primacy in the formation of individual preferences toward trade. Put differently, I show
that non-material factors define the scope conditions for longstanding models of trade
preferences based on rational economic self-interest.
The approach and conclusions of this chapter make a number of significant contribu-
tions to the study of public opinion in international political economy, and to the study
of international trade more broadly. Most importantly, my theory and findings push
scholarship on globalization opinion toward a more nuanced and complete conception of
individual preference formation. Students of public opinion in IPE have for some time
debated the relative importance of material versus non-material sources of individual
preferences over economic globalization, but the role and relationship of these two kinds
of factors were never directly addressed. Building upon the concept of affective judgment
and the theory of symbolic politics, I advance a theoretical framework that accounts for
both material and non-material factors, breaking the dichotomous debate that has come
to characterize this area of study.
My argument also highlights possibilities for further, theoretically-informed investi-
gations into both the process and implications of affectively formed preferences in the
context of international trade. The theory of symbolic politics suggests that the symbols
associated with trade—it is a transaction with a “foreign other,” for instance—evoke an
affective response based on general and stable symbolic predispositions such as prejudice,
nationalism, or attitudes toward foreign cultures. The notion that trade opinion is the
product of primarily emotional rather than cognitive responses can shed considerable
light, for example, on our understanding of the public discourse and politics of economic
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globalization. Economists have long expressed surprise and dismay over the public pre-
sentation of globalization in emotionally charged and logically irrelevant terms (Krugman
1996; Mankiw and Swagel 2006).15 Indeed, a significant proportion of public communica-
tions about economic globalization—including pro-globalization messages—are designed
to activate symbolic attitudes such as prejudice and nationalism (Skonieczky 2001; Mul-
lainathan et al. 2008). But if individuals, on average, respond to international trade
affectively and in accordance with their symbolic predispositions, then the economically
irrelevant frames commonly employed by political elites in public discussions of trade
policy become expected rather than surprising (Sears 2001).
In a context where trade agreements are increasingly made with specific countries or
regions, the primacy of symbolic predispositions in the formation of trade preferences has
further important implications for politics and policy. Scholarship on trade opinion is
overwhelmingly concerned with preferences over trade in general, but polling data indi-
cates that in the United States at least, the public’s support for trade varies substantially
across trading partners (Kohut et al. 2010). Consistent with the results presented in
Chapter 2, the findings of this chapter again strongly suggest that this variation is due to
partners’ degree of cultural foreignness, not just their economic characteristics. With the
primacy of symbolic predispositions established in this study, students of globalization
will be much better equipped to investigate these unexplored contours of trade politics,
as well as their implications for policy.
More generally, this chapter contributes to the extension of the theory of symbolic
politics itself, and to the study of public opinion more broadly. While the theory of
symbolic politics implies that rational considerations become salient when strong symbolic
predispositions are lacking, it does not advance any explicit hypotheses about preference
formation under weak or neutral symbolic attitudes. The argument I have presented
15In his leaked Republican playbook, for example, communications strategist Frank Luntz advises
Republican Congressional candidates: “Never, never, never begin a response to [economic globalization]
by saying it is beneficial to the U.S. economy. Never... Don’t talk like economists. The key word is
winning. It is essential that you capture the theme of winning and insert it into all your communications
efforts” (Luntz 2005). Arnold Schwarzenegger was presumably following such advice when he defended
free trade at the 2004 Republican National Convention by exhorting Americans not to be “economic
girlie men” (Mullainathan et al. 2008).
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extends the theory in that direction. This chapter highlights the possibility that, in
areas where symbolic attitudes have a strong impact on behavior or opinion, paying
closer attention to those who have neutral attitudes might reveal important second order
dynamics at play. My findings also suggest that potentially important relationships might
be masked when neutral or weak positions are either ignored or excluded on symbolic
and identity-based attitudinal scales.
Finally, the chapter introduces beliefs about the personal and country-level impact
of trade as dependent rather independent variables in the study of trade opinion. It has
already been established that treating such beliefs as independent variables is problem-
atic when expressed trade policy preferences are the outcome to be explained (Fordham
Kleinberg 2012). Belief variables, however, have not been sufficiently exploited as depen-
dent variables in this context. Given that these beliefs are extremely strong predictors of
policy preferences, the factors driving them are also very likely to be indirectly affecting
individual preferences over policy. Including them as additional outcome variables will
afford us greater leverage in explaining public opinion toward globalization.
While the empirical evidence in support of my argument is clearly strong, a few caveats
are necessary. This study has focused on only one measure of economic self-interest—
albeit a very central one. The absence of a clean and direct measure of individual skill in
this data precludes testing the argument using a skill-based measure of workers’ material
self-interest.16 This study, like nearly all other studies of individual trade preferences,17
is also limited in that it derives trade opinion from questions about international trade
in general. A more faithful test of the theory of industry-based trade preferences would,
of course, require a study of attitudes toward protection for specific industries, with the
expectation that individuals will favor protective measures for their own industry, but
not for others. More recent trade theory also suggests that trade liberalization might
create winners and losers within each industry (Melitz 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008;
16Education is of course measured, but it is hardly a measure of skill alone. Indeed, Rho and Tomz
(2013) have recently shown that the negative correlation between education and protectionism is unlikely
to reflect a desire to maximize returns to one’s own factors of production. A measure of occupation is
not correlated with trade preferences in this data.
17The only exception of which I am aware is Rho and Tomz (2013).
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Osgood 2012). As better measures and tests of these alternative accounts of material
self-interest emerge, the broader validity of my theory can also be tested.
Finally, the design of this study cannot rule out the possibility that under some rela-
tively rare and extreme economic circumstances, material self-interest might overwhelm
symbolic predispositions even among those who hold strong symbolic attitudes. If the
loss of one’s economic livelihood is clearly and directly threatened—that is to say, when
the trade-related threat to material welfare is direct, immediate, and great—economic
survival may indeed dominate all other considerations.18 But this qualification does not
detract from the overall force and significance of my argument. What this chapter has
shown is that among the broad mass of voters, and at least where a central and long-
standing measure of material self-interest is concerned, symbolic factors enjoy a higher
level of priority in the formation of trade preferences: symbolic predispositions are first
order factors that can altogether trump the contribution of economic self-interest to an
individual’s stance on international trade.
18Joshua Kertzer, for example, makes a related point, showing that when economic circumstances
reach a certain threshold, the effect of more subjective assessments on isolationist foreign policy attitudes
dissipates (Kertzer 2013).
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Chapter 4
Whom Does Trade Help?
Foreign-Regarding Considerations as a
Source of Trade Preferences
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, subjective beliefs about the impact of international trade have been ad-
vanced as key sources of individual trade preferences. Two types of subjective beliefs, in
particular, have received attention. First, it has been argued that regardless of trade’s
objective implications for self-interest, beliefs about trade’s effect on one’s self and fam-
ily might be significant drivers of trade opinion. Second, and much more prominently,
sociotropic perceptions—beliefs about how trade affects one’s country as a whole—have
been presented as important sources of attitudes toward international trade (Mansfield
and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Interestingly, however, the possibility that
trade preferences are shaped by beliefs about the impact of trade beyond one’s borders
has neither been raised nor investigated.
This chapters introduces the notion of foreign-regarding considerations into the study
of globalization opinion, arguing that perceptions of trade’s impact abroad can shape
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public opinion toward trade at home. Specifically, I contend that the trade preferences of
“cosmopolitan” individuals (i.e., those with very positive attitudes toward out-groups) are
especially susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding concerns. To examine these claims
empirically, I employ a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative
sample of Americans, supplementing the results with an analysis of open-ended responses
provided by all the subjects. Taken together, the findings provide the first evidence of
foreign-regarding motivations in the context of trade preferences.
This study is primarily motivated by a puzzling observation: against theoretical ex-
pectations derived from political psychology, cosmopolitans are not indifferent to the
cultural foreignness of trading partners. Rather, individuals with highly positive atti-
tudes toward out-groups display a pattern of reverse discrimination, favoring trade with
countries that are more culturally distant. In the section that follows, I introduce this
empirical puzzle, considering first the theoretical relationship between symbolic attitudes
and individual trade preferences, and highlighting the observable implications of this re-
lationship for the preferences of individuals at opposite ends of the symbolic attitudinal
spectrum (i.e., prejudiced individuals versus cosmopolitans). Next, in Section 4.3, I turn
to foreign-regarding concerns as a potential explanation for the observed reverse discrimi-
nation, arguing that cosmopolitan trade preferences are motivated by beliefs about trade’s
impact abroad. Section 4.4 describes the design of the study, while Sections 4.5 and 4.6
present the empirical analysis and results. Finally, I consider some potential objections to
my argument before presenting the conclusions and implications of the chapter in Section
4.8.
A brief word at the outset about my use of the term “cosmopolitan” will be useful.
Cosmopolitanism is a rich concept with a long history. The term has been used to
characterize a wide variety of attitudes, particularly in moral and political philosophy.
In that literature, the core idea shared by cosmopolitans is typically the view that all
human beings are citizens of a single community, regardless of race or nationality (Appiah
2006; Caney 2005; Scheﬄer 2001). In this chapter, however, I adopt a relatively narrow
definition, using the term simply as a label: here, cosmopolitans are those who fall on
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one extreme of the symbolic attitudinal scale—namely, those who hold highly positive
attitudes toward out-groups.
4.2 Attitudes toward Out-Groups and Public Opinion
toward International Trade
For over a decade, students of international political economy have observed a strong
statistical association between symbolic attitudes1 of various kinds and public opinion
toward international trade. These findings consistently reveal that negative attitudes
toward out-groups (i.e., prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalistic chauvinism, etc.) are
associated with protectionism, while positive out-group attitudes are strongly correlated
with support for economic exchange across borders. However, this association between
symbolic attitudes and trade opinion has generally been framed with an emphasis on the
negative end of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum.
For example, Sinnott and O’Rourke (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) analyze
cross-national survey data and report that various measures of nationalist sentiment are
strongly correlated with protectionist trade preferences. Likewise, Rankin (2001) argues
that nationalistic attachment is a key factor in explaining opposition to trade. Focus-
ing on the United States, Rankin finds that attachment to what he calls “patriotic,”
“sovereign,” and “cultural” conceptions of national identity are all highly correlated with
protectionism. To capture symbolic attitudes, Mansfield and Mutz’s 2009 study of Amer-
ican trade opinion relies primarily on ethnocentrism scales designed to tap “prejudice,
broadly conceived” (p. 440). As the study reports, the association between ethnocen-
trism and negative trade sentiment is very strong. More recently, Dong et al. (2013)
replicate Mansfield and Mutz’s finding using a sample of Chinese citizens, reporting that
prejudiced Chinese citizens are more likely to oppose international trade.
In Chapter 2, I investigated the nature of the association between prejudice and
protectionism in an experimental setting, showing that prejudice has a causal effect on
trade opinion, and that this effect is very large. Specifically, I took inspiration from
1The terms “symbolic attitudes” and “symbolic predispositions” are also used interchangeably in this
chapter.
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Bertrand and Mullainathan’s famous resume experiment (2004)—where names on identi-
cal resumes are manipulated to identify the presence of racial discrimination in the U.S.
labor market—to investigate the effect of “cultural distance” from trading partners on in-
dividual trade preferences. The survey experiment, fielded on a nationally representative
sample of Americans, isolated the effect of cultural distance by manipulating only the
name of a hypothetical foreign firm that would be affected by a potential U.S. trade mea-
sure. I found that among highly prejudiced2 Americans, cultural distance from trading
partners more than doubles opposition to international trade, independent of economic
considerations.
These results are not surprising. While the theoretical relationship between prej-
udice and protectionism—and symbolic attitudes and trade opinion, more broadly—is
left unexplored and underdeveloped in many studies, theories of heuristic judgment and
symbolic politics from political psychology expect the association to be both strong and
causal. Indeed, I argue extensively in Chapters 2 and 3 that the symbols associated
with trade—it represents a transaction with a “foreign other,” for instance—evoke an
automatic, affective response based on stable, individual-level predispositions such as
generalized prejudice, cosmopolitanism, or nationalism. As research in social psychology
indicates, the mind relies on shortcuts wherever possible to avoid the effortful mental
work of conscious and deliberate reasoning (Kahneman 2011). In the formation of pref-
erences over trade, these cognitive shortcuts are delivered by individual attitudes toward
out-groups, whether positive or negative. The empirical expectation is clear: individ-
ual trade preferences will be affected by symbolic predispositions such as prejudice and
cosmopolitanism.
In observational studies of trade opinion, where attitudes toward trade in general are
typically measured, this prediction is straightforwardly reflected in the finding that prej-
udice and cosmopolitanism are associated with negative and positive trade sentiment,
respectively. In the context of certain experimental investigations of trade opinion, how-
2Throughout this chapter, the term “prejudiced” is used simply as a label for those who have especially
negative attitudes toward out-groups. Clearly, this designation is not intended as an indictment of those
individuals’ character.
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ever, the implication might be somewhat less obvious. Indeed, depending on the study,
positive and negative out-group attitudes may not simply have corresponding opposite
effects.
For example, in the survey experiment presented in Chapter 2, prejudiced Americans
behaved as expected, discriminating against firms that were assumed to be from culturally
distant parts of the world. In contrast, Americans on the opposite end of the symbolic
attitudinal scale—i.e., those with positive out-group attitudes—should not exhibit any
discriminatory behavior. According to the theory presented briefly above, the cultural
proximity or distance of a trading partner should not affect cosmopolitans’ support for
trade. Unlike the prejudiced, who respond negatively to cultural difference, cosmopolitans
are expected to be just as willing to trade with countries that are culturally foreign as
those which are culturally familiar. Curiously, however, this is not the pattern I observe.
Indeed, as I show in Section 4.5, cultural distance increases support for trade among
cosmopolitans. Why might this be the case?
4.3 For Whom is Trade Good? Cosmopolitans and
Foreign-Regarding Considerations
Conventional political economy models of trade opinion highlight objective material self-
interest as the key source of individual trade preferences (Alt et al. 1996). Whether
they emphasize an individual’s skill level, industry of employment, or some other rele-
vant economic characteristic, these models implicitly assume that members of the public
understand the actual implications of trade for their economic interests.
In recent years, however, subjective beliefs about the impact of trade have been ad-
vanced as sources of public opinion toward trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield
and Mutz 2013). First, it has been argued that regardless of trade’s objective economic
self-impact, subjective beliefs about trade’s effect on one’s self and family might be sig-
nificant drivers of trade preferences. Second, and much more prominently, sociotropic
perceptions—beliefs about how trade affects one’s country as a whole—have been pre-
sented as important sources of attitudes toward international trade. Most notably, Mans-
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field and Mutz argue that, like attitudes toward other aspects of economic policy, indi-
vidual trade preferences are powerfully shaped by the perceived collective consequences
of trade policy for the economy of the nation (2009; 2013).
While the causal priority of sociotropic beliefs with respect to trade preferences re-
mains to be established, the introduction of sociotropic influence into the debate is an
important and promising conceptual development. But if beliefs about trade’s national -
level impact can shape opinion, might beliefs about the effect of trade on foreigners also
play role? To my knowledge, this possibility has yet to receive scholarly attention. On the
one hand, it is not surprising that the potential role of foreign-regarding concerns has not
been explored in the context of trade opinion. The shift in focus away from material self-
interest explanations and toward factors such as symbolic attitudes and sociotropic beliefs
is a relatively new—and still controversial (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012)—development
in the study of preferences in international political economy. That attitudes toward trade
might be shaped by the perceived interests of peoples and countries beyond one’s borders
represents an especially large theoretical leap given the received wisdom and history of
the field.
On the other hand, it seems almost intuitive that some subset of the population—
those with an especially cosmopolitan worldview, in particular—would be motivated by
foreign-regarding concerns. Suggestive evidence of a similar phenomenon already exists in
the adjacent issue-area of foreign aid. Milner and Tingley (2013) find, for example, that
in a representative survey of Americans, more liberal voters respond more favorably to
foreign economic aid when it targets the neediest groups abroad, while more conservative
voters are more supportive of aid when it serves the interests of the U.S. economy. Their
finding is relevant here, not because cosmopolitans (as I define them) and liberals can be
equated, but rather, because it suggests that in certain segments of the American public,
concerns about the well-being of foreigners might be driving individual policy preferences.
My contention in this chapter is that beliefs about the impact of trade policy abroad
are an important and greatly understudied source of public opinion toward international
trade. Specifically, I expect the trade preferences of those who have highly positive
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attitudes toward out-groups to be especially susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding
considerations. To examine this claim empirically, I exploit the experimental design
presented in Chapter 2 and briefly described in Section 4.2, supplementing the results
with a systematic analysis of subjects’ open-ended responses. The next section turns
again to the design of the study.
4.4 Experimental Design
4.4.1 Overview
To investigate sources of trade preferences across various subsets of the population, I
designed a population-based survey experiment (Mutz 2011) that was fielded on a sample
of 1,001 Americans from July 13 to July 16, 2013. The GfK Group conducted the
survey using the web-enabled KnowledgePanel, a probability-based panel designed to be
representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by
a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected
households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the KnowledgePanel.
For those who agree to participate, but do not already have internet access, GfK provides
at no cost a laptop and ISP connection. People who already have computers and internet
service are permitted to participate using their own equipment.
As mentioned above, I take inspiration from Bertrand and Mullainathan’s famous re-
sume experiment (2004) to investigate the effect of cultural distance from trading partners
on public opinion toward trade. All subjects were informed of a potential policy measure
that would ease U.S. trade restrictions and make it easier for some foreign firms to sell
their products in the United States. Subjects were then presented with the hypothetical
example of one company that would be affected by such a trade measure (i.e., a foreign
company for whom it would become easier to export goods into the U.S. as a result of the
trade policy under consideration). Finally, respondents were asked to report their level
of opposition or support for the potential trade measure before an open-ended question
prompted them to explain their expressed trade opinion.
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The first experimental manipulation of the study concerns the name of the hypothet-
ical foreign firm that was presented to respondents. Subjects were assigned to a firm
name that was shown (through prior experimental investigation—see below) to sound
either culturally familiar or ambiguously foreign. A second manipulation involved the
economic characteristics of the hypothetical firm, specifically, whether the skill level of
the company’s labor input is high or low. In all treatment conditions, respondents were
explicitly informed that the hypothetical foreign firm is from a country that poses no
political or security threats to the United States, and that the company respects safety
and labor standards. Furthermore, I collect data on respondents’ attitudes toward out-
groups, enabling me to observe the effect of cultural distance on the trade preferences of
cosmopolitans specifically.
4.4.2 Culturally Familiar versus Ambiguously Foreign: The
Choice of Firm Names
Clearly, the choice of a culturally foreign and a culturally familiar firm name is central to
the success of this study and to the credibility of its findings. Most importantly, in order
to avoid the possibility that the results are driven by the cultural, economic, or political
characteristics of any one country or part of the world, it is essential that the name used
to signal cultural distance is ambiguously foreign. That is to say, the chosen name should
not be easily or overwhelmingly associated by subjects with a single country or cluster of
countries. Rather, what is needed is a name whose believed origin enjoys a relatively even
distribution across a reasonably broad range of culturally distant countries and regions.
Given this criterion, I tested the suitability of numerous invented and quasi-invented
names through a series of surveys on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Respondents
on MTurk were asked: “[Firm Name] is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company.
Which country or part of the world would you say that [Firm Name] is from? Please be
as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those
that come immediately to mind.” Based on responses to this question, I finally identified
the name “Tuntyakore & Zideying” as an ideal candidate. The preceding question was
also posed at the outset of this survey to those in the culturally foreign treatment group of
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the nationally representative sample. Their answers—classified according to the standard
United Nations Geographical Region Groupings3 and represented in Figure 4.1—confirm
the suitability of “Tuntyakore & Zideying” as an ambiguously foreign firm name.
Figure 4.1: Tuntyakore & Zideying’s Believed Country of Origin.
Note: Figure 4.1 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question:
“Tuntyakore & Zideying is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part
of the world would you say that Tuntyakore & Zideying is from? Please be as specific as possible and
remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind.” I clas-
sified countries and geographic areas according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region
Groupings, with three exceptions. First, I collapse the sub-regions identified by the UN classification as
Northern, Western, and Southern Europe into the one category commonly known as “Western Europe.”
Second, because about 50% of the respondents who identified Tuntyakore & Zideying as being from the
African continent did so by simply identifying the continent as a whole (i.e., “Africa”), I collapse the UN’s
African sub-regions into one category. Note that among the remaining 50% of responses that identified
the name as African, but did so more specifically by identifying a particular country or sub-region of the
continent, no particular area of Africa was overrepresented. In other words, all areas of the continent
were represented relatively evenly. Third, I include an additional category called “Asia” to represent
the small minority who responded to the question by simply answering “Asia” and not specifying any
particular country or region within that continent.
As a company name that signals cultural proximity, I chose “Gordon & Roberts.”
MTurk respondents identified this name primarily with the United Kingdom, but “Gordon
& Roberts” was also strongly associated with Canada and a number of other Western
3See United Nations Statistics Division (2013).
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European countries. The responses of those in the culturally familiar treatment group
of the nationally representative sample, again offered at the outset of this survey and
represented in Figure 4.2, largely reflect the MTurk findings.
Figure 4.2: Gordon & Roberts’ Believed Country of Origin.
Note: Figure 4.2 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question: “Gor-
don & Roberts is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world
would you say that Gordon & Roberts is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the
most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind.”
Needless to say, this study relies heavily on the assumption that cultural distance is
binary in the context of trade preference formation. While this assumption is unlikely
to be accurate, for the purposes of this study, it is both reasonable and highly useful: it
enables us to isolate the effect of cultural distance on trade preferences and to investigate
the interaction of cultural factors with economic ones.
4.4.3 Stimulus and Manipulation Check
Respondents were presented with the following information and question:
Now consider that the United States is contemplating the removal of trade
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restrictions which would allow some foreign companies to more freely sell
their goods in the United States. As a hypothetical example, consider the
case of [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ], one such foreign firm.
[Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] has the following characteristics:
It has about 500 workers.
[Over 90% of its workers are not college educated, and approximately 60% have
not completed high school./Approximately 60% of its workforce has a PhD or
other advanced degree, and over 90% of its workforce is university educated.]
The company respects safety and labor standards, and is based in a country
that poses no political or security threats to the United States.
Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow
firms such as [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] to more freely sell
their goods in the United States?
The two manipulations—the name of the firm (culturally familiar or culturally foreign)
and the skill level of its workers (high or low)—yield a 2x2 design with four treatment
conditions. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these four groups.
As explained in Section 4.4.2, respondents were asked to guess the geographic origin
of Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts in the survey’s opening question. The next
question on the survey (still before exposure to the firm-related information and question
above) was designed to strengthen the effectiveness4 of the treatment by asking subjects:
“Think for a few moments about the country or part of the world that [Tuntyakore &
Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] is from. What language or languages are spoken there? If
you’re not sure, don’t worry—just take a guess.” The purpose of this second question is
simply to fix in the respondent’s mind her original guess, reducing the likelihood that she
would change her mind about the firm’s country of origin (and potentially, its cultural
familiarity or foreignness) upon learning of the firm’s other characteristics.
To monitor the latter possibility, I included the following post-treatment manipula-
tion check after measuring the dependent variable: “Did you continue to assume that
[Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] is from [respondent’s original answer ]?”
4I use the term “effective” here to mean that the treatment is effective in producing the intended
variation in the independent variable, not that it is effective in altering the dependent variable.
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Those who answered “no” were asked where they assumed Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon
& Roberts to be from. Over 80% of respondents maintained their original answer. Those
who changed their mind did not do so in a way that significantly altered the original
distribution of guesses across different regions of the world. As a result, the changed
answers do not lead to a noticeable shift away from the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulation.
4.4.4 Measuring Cosmopolitanism
Given my focus in this study on the factors motivating the trade preferences of cosmopoli-
tans, measuring individual attitudes toward out-groups is of central importance. To do
so, I rely primarily on an abridged Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) index. SDO
scales, used by psychologists to measure racial and ethnic prejudice, offer a number of
significant advantages to the study of symbolic attitudes and trade preferences.
The concept of SDO comes from Social Dominance Theory, a social psychological
theory based on the idea that “all human societies tend to be structured systems of
group-based hierarchies” consisting of “one or a small number of dominant and hegemonic
groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate groups at the bottom” (Sidanius and
Pratto 1999, p. 31). From this theory emerged the individual-level variable called social
dominance orientation, “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate or
be superior to out-groups” (Pratto et al. 1994). As Pratto et al. explain, “We consider
SDO to be a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether
one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along
a superior-inferior dimension” (Pratto et al. 1994, p. 741).
SDO is very strongly and consistently correlated with common measures of out-group
attitudes such as racism and nationalism (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Importantly, these
correlations hold even when rather different measures of racism and nationalism are used.
This reflects one of the great strengths of SDO as a measure of symbolic predispositions
in this context, namely, that it has been shown to capture the underlying predisposition
(i.e., a generalized preference for group dominance or equality) that drives more specific,
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and often culturally-contingent, symbolic attitudes at both ends of the spectrum (Pratto
et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 1992). In other words, SDO in fact taps the fundamental
predisposition underlying all the symbolic attitudes which have been found to correlate
with trade preferences in various observational studies. In sum, SDO offers what is likely
to be the most basic, generalizable—and thus appropriate—measure of relevant symbolic
predispositions (“positive” or “negative”) in the context of globalization opinion.5
Here, I am obviously interested in individuals at the “positive” extreme of the SDO
scale—those at the opposite end of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum from the highly
prejudiced or extremely nationalistic. After administering the treatment, measuring the
dependent variable, checking the manipulation, and collecting additional demographic
information, I present respondents with questions from a two-point SDO scale. Specifi-
cally, I asked subjects to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with each of
the following statements:
“In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.”
“We should not push for group equality.”
Response options spanned a five-point scale, ranging from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly
disagree.” To construct a measure of SDO, I first code responses to each of these two
statements so that in each case, those favoring (opposing) group equality have lower
(higher) scores on a five-point scale. I then average the two scores, yielding a five-point
SDO variable. In the analysis that follows, those with an SDO score of “1”—individuals,
in other words, who have very positive attitudes toward out-groups—are regarded as
“cosmopolitans.”
5This is also important for the eventual extension of this study and others like it to contexts beyond
the United States. As a measure of out-group attitudes that is not specific to any particular content or
culture, SDO can serve as a consistent measure of symbolic predispositions across cultures, countries,
and contexts. Indeed, a recent study of SDO in 15 languages and 20 countries shows that the measure
is highly general and cross-culturally robust (Pratto et al. 2012). The lion’s share of scholarship on
mass attitudes toward international trade and globalization focuses on the United States, and studies
that rigorously examine the role of symbolic predispositions in the formation of trade preferences outside
the American context are especially scarce. The use of a generalizable measure such as SDO can help
facilitate greater cross-cultural research in this area.
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4.4.5 Trade Preferences and Open-Ended Follow-Up
Recall from Section 4.4.3 that the dependent variable in this study (i.e., trade support) is
derived from responses to the question below, with response options spanning a five-point
scale from “Strongly support” to “Strongly oppose”:
Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow
firms such as [Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts ] to more freely sell
their goods in the United States?
One of the innovations of this study is the collection and analysis of open-ended re-
sponses to better understand the micro-foundations of trade preferences. Immediately
after measuring the dependent variable, I asked all respondents the following open-ended
question:
Think back to how you answered the last question. What considerations or
feelings led you to answer in the way that you did? Please be as specific
and detailed as possible, writing several sentences. Your thoughts are very
important to us. Also, please try to use correct spelling.
The procedure used to code these responses is explained at length in Section 4.6, below.
Figure 4.3 outlines the experimental design of the study and maps the order in which
respondents were exposed to the relevant stimuli and questions.6
Figure 4.3: Map of Experimental Procedure.
6To address concerns that the treatment might somehow prime out-group attitudes, a series of un-
related demographic and knowledge questions precede the measurement of symbolic attitudes in this
experiment.
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4.5 Cosmopolitanism, Cultural Distance, and Trade
Preferences: Initial Findings
Does cultural distance from trading partners have an effect on the trade preferences
of cosmopolitans? The theoretical framework I summarized in Section 4.2—based on
theories of heuristic judgment and symbolic politics—expects no discrimination from
cosmopolitans on the basis of cultural foreignness or familiarity. In other words, unlike the
trade preferences of the prejudiced, the level of trade support expressed by cosmopolitans
should not be affected by the hypothetical firm name to which they are exposed.
As I explain at the outset of this chapter, however, this expectation is not met.
Cosmopolitans are not indifferent to cultural distance in the context of trade; indeed,
they appear to strongly favor cultural foreignness over familiarity. Table 4.1 summarizes
the estimated effect of a trading partner’s cultural foreignness on support for trade among
cosmopolitans, pooling over both economic treatment conditions (i.e., low- and highly
skilled workforce).
Table 4.1: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Support for Trade
among Cosmopolitans, Pooling over Economic Treatment Conditions.
Level of Trade Support among Cosmopolitans
Culturally Foreign Treatment 81.8
Culturally Familiar Treatment 65.6
Difference 16.2
95% Confidence Interval (1.6 to 30.8)
p-value 0.030
Note: The table presents the percentage of cosmopolitan respondents who supported easing trade
restrictions when the affected non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar,
pooling over the two economic treatment conditions. The difference is the estimated effect of cultural
distance on trade support, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The sample sizes for the
analysis were 77 for the Culturally Foreign Treatment and 61 for the Culturally Familiar Treatment.
The table shows the percentage of cosmopolitan respondents who supported easing
trade restrictions when the affected (hypothetical) non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign
and when it was culturally familiar. The results reveal that cultural foreignness has a
significant effect on support for trade in this subgroup. Approximately 81.8% of cos-
mopolitans supported the easing of trade restrictions when the non-U.S. firm was cultur-
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ally foreign, versus 65.6% when the hypothetical firm was culturally familiar (p=0.030).
Cultural distance thus leads to a more than 25% increase in support for trade among
those with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups.7
What accounts for this result? One possibility is that the theory I advance has
different implications than those I anticipate. Specifically, it might be the case that
positive symbolic attitudes lead individuals to a form of reverse discrimination: rather
than being indifferent to cultural distance, cosmopolitans have a more positive affective
response to trade when the trading partner is more culturally foreign. In the context of
the current experiment, this would imply greater levels of support under the culturally
foreign treatment, exactly as we observe. Under this interpretation, furthermore, the
effect of cultural distance should not depend on the skill level of the firm’s workers.
In other words, since cultural distance is driving the increase in trade support via an
emotional gut reaction, conditioning the analysis on the skill level of the hypothetical
firm’s labor input should yield similar results. Indeed, as Chapter 2 reports, cultural
distance significantly increases opposition to trade among the prejudiced regardless of
the hypothetical workforce’s skill level, whether high or low.
Another possibility is that the observed difference in trade support is due to foreign-
regarding considerations. If respondents associate cultural distance with poorer economic
conditions in general, they may feel more supportive of firms or workers who produce
goods in culturally distant parts of the world. Put differently, individuals with a cos-
mopolitan worldview might be motivated to support trade out of a desire to help those
in (perceived) economic need, resulting in greater trade support when need is perceived
to be higher. Here, the effect of cultural distance may very well depend on the skill level
of the hypothetical firm’s workforce. If cosmopolitans are motivated by the desire to
assist those who are economically needy, low-skilled workers in culturally foreign parts
of the world will represent more compelling candidates for help than their highly skilled
counterparts, who might enjoy greater economic opportunities and a higher standard of
7The results reported in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 (below) are robust to the exclusion of respondents
whose beliefs about the country origin of Tuntyakore & Zideying cluster around any one geographic
sub-region. In other words, the results remain virtually unchanged when any one part of the world (e.g.,
Africa, Southern Asian, etc.) is excluded from the analysis.
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living.
Table 4.2 presents the estimated effect of cultural distance on support for trade among
cosmopolitans, this time conditioning the analysis on the skill level of the hypothetical
firm’s labor input. Once again, I present the percentage of cosmopolitan respondents
who supported easing trade restrictions in each treatment group. Among those who
received the “Low-Skilled” treatment (Column 1), the impact of cultural distance is strong:
support for trade rose sharply from 57.9% of cosmopolitans when the hypothetical firm
was cultural familiar, to 88.1% when the firm was culturally foreign. Cultural distance
thus increased support for trade in this subgroup by more than 52%. This represents a rise
of more than 30 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 11.5 to 48.9. Clearly,
this effect is highly significant both statistically and substantively. In sharp contrast,
among cosmopolitans who received the “Highly Skilled” economic treatment (Column 2),
the effect of cultural distance on trade preferences is not statistically different than zero.
Table 4.2: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Support for Trade
among Cosmopolitans, Conditioning on the Skill Level of the Hypothetical
Firm’s Workforce.
Level of Trade Support among Cosmopolitans
(1) (2)
Low-Skilled Workforce
Treatment
Highly Skilled Workforce
Treatment
Culturally Foreign Treatment 81.8 74.3
Culturally Familiar Treatment 57.9 78.3
Difference 30.2 4.0
95% Confidence Interval (11.5 to 48.9) (-27.4 to 19.4)
p-value 0.002 0.735
Note: The table presents the percentage of respondents who supported easing trade restrictions in each
treatment group. The difference is the estimated effect of cultural distance conditional on economic
treatment, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The sample sizes for the analysis presented
in the first column were 42 for the Culturally Foreign Treatment and 38 for the Culturally Familiar
Treatment. The corresponding sample sizes for the analysis presented in the second column were 35
and 23.
The results presented in Table 4.2 are very telling. First, they rule out the possibil-
ity that cosmopolitanism leads to reverse discrimination on the basis of cultural factors
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alone. Second, they offer preliminary support for the hypothesis that foreign-regarding
considerations play a role in the formation of trade preferences among cosmopolitans.
That the impact of cultural distance on trade support depends on the Low-Skilled treat-
ment suggests that cosmopolitan support for trade is motivated by a desire to help the
most economically needy. Where poorly skilled workers are concerned, it appears that
trading with parts of the world that are associated with relatively poor economic con-
ditions and fewer opportunities is much more attractive to cosmopolitans than is trade
with culturally similar countries. The broader implication for our understanding of trade
preferences is significant: these findings suggest that in some subset of the population,
trade preferences are shaped by considerations that are strictly foreign-regarding. To in-
vestigate this proposition further, I turn next to an analysis of the open-ended responses
provided by subjects.
4.6 Trade as Aid: Evidence of Foreign-Regarding
Concerns as Sources of Trade Preferences
Although the use of surveys and survey experiments is very common in political science
research (and becoming increasingly more common in the study of international political
economy), the analysis of open-ended responses remains extremely unusual (Roberts et
al. 2014). Open-ended questions have rarely been used in the experimental study of
any political science topic,8 and to my knowledge, they have never been used in survey-
based studies of globalization opinion, whether experimental or otherwise. Despite its
possible drawbacks (the possibility of post-hoc justification in subjects’ responses to open-
ended follow-up questions, for example), the analysis of open-ended responses presents a
potentially powerful new tool for the investigation of individual preferences over economic
globalization.
Recall that in this study, after expressing her level of support or opposition to the
easing of trade restrictions on a five-point scale, each subject was asked to explain the
reasons for her expressed trade preference. To further unpack the micro-foundations
8Two exceptions are Tomz 2007 and Gadarian and Albertson 2014.
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of preferences toward trade, I systematically analyze these open-ended explanations. I
am especially interested in observing whether (as anticipated above) foreign-regarding
justifications of trade opinion are significantly more prevalent among cosmopolitans in the
Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment group than in the Culturally Foreign/Highly
Skilled treatment group. Although such a finding would neither establish the causal
impact of foreign-regarding considerations on trade preferences nor conclusively explain
the difference in cosmopolitan support across the aforementioned treatment groups, it
would provide, for the first time, very strong suggestive evidence that foreign-regarding
concerns are important sources of public opinion toward trade in a sizeable subset of the
population.
Of the 1,001 respondents in the sample, approximately 60% either misunderstood the
open-ended question, did not provide an answer, or gave a response that was otherwise
unclear or unclassifiable.9 Of those who did provide a classifiable answer, responses fell
into five categories. The first category includes reasons that were described earlier in
this chapter as “sociotropic” considerations. These are responses that expressed only a
concern for the interests of the United States as a whole. Most of these concerns were
economic in nature (U.S. jobs gained or lost, cost of products to U.S. consumers, etc.),
but some respondents offered security-related considerations as well. The second category
includes individuals who offered exclusively foreign-regarding concerns, with the majority
expressing a desire to help improve the economic well-being of foreign workers. Those
who expressed both sociotropic and foreign-regarding considerations—explaining that the
proposed trade policy would either help or harm both Americans and foreigners—fell into
the third category.
The fourth category reflects reasoning based in abstract economic principles. These
respondents, who overwhelmingly favored trade, referenced economic concepts such as
comparative advantage (whether implicitly or explicitly), or made statements such as,
“All trade is always good for everyone.” Finally, the fifth category includes individuals
who articulated a relatively narrow range of other considerations. These include abstract
9This proportion is roughly equal across treatment groups and across SDO-based subgroups.
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principles of fairness and reciprocity between countries (“If they allow our exports, then
we should accept theirs.”), a belief in the competence of the hypothetical company, a
perception that the hypothetical company adheres to norms shared by U.S. firms, or
more rarely, expressions of self-interest.
A research assistant and I separately read and coded the reason(s) offered by each
subject for his expressed trade opinion, classifying each response into one of the five
categories just described. When a discrepancy arose between my classification and that
of the other coder (this occurred in less than 10% of cases), I made the final coding
decision. All coding was obviously done blindly, without knowledge of the respondents’
expressed trade preferences or of their cosmopolitan status.10
The results are highly supportive of the proposition that the trade preferences of
cosmopolitans are susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding considerations. Table
4.3 presents the percentage of all cosmopolitans in each treatment group who fall into
each of the five response categories. Among cosmopolitans who received the Culturally
Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment, 55.6% justify their trade opinion by appealing exclu-
sively to the interests of foreigners, compared to only 11.1% percent in the Culturally
Familiar/Low-Skilled treatment group (p < 0.001).
Table 4.4 focuses only on cosmopolitans who support trade, showing the percentage
of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in each treatment group who fall into each of the five
classifications. As we would expect, the relevant differences in preference justification here
are wider. Over 65% of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in the Culturally Foreign/Low-
Skilled treatment group justify their support for trade by appealing exclusively to foreign-
regarding considerations, versus just 7.1% percent in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled
treatment group (p=0.005). In the latter group, where cosmopolitan support for trade
was significantly lower, sociotropic concerns are by far the most common justification
10I chose to hand-code the open-ended responses in this study because I wanted to become as directly
familiar as possible with the collected data. However, my analysis of these open-ended responses might
benefit considerably from use of the structural topic model presented in Roberts et al. 2014 for the semi-
automated analysis survey responses. The latter approach classifies and analyzes open-ended responses
while incorporating information that is particular to each respondent (e.g., symbolic attitudes, treatment
group, etc.) and making it possible to use the analysis of the open-ended textual data to estimate
treatment effects.
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Table 4.3: Reasons Offered by All Cosmopolitans for Their Expressed Trade
Preference.
Reason Offered for Expressed Trade Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Group
U.S.
Interests
Only
Foreign-
Regarding
Concerns
Only
Both U.S.
Interests
and
Foreign-
Regarding
Economic
Principles Other
Culturally
Foreign/
Low-Skilled
14.8% 55.6% 18.5% 3.7% 7.4%
Culturally
Familiar/
Low-Skilled
63.0% 11.1% 7.4% 7.4% 11.1%
Culturally
Foreign/ Highly
Skilled
56.5% 8.7% 0.0% 0.0% 34.8%
Culturally
Familiar/ Highly
Skilled
62.5% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 18.8%
Note: The table presents the percentage of all cosmopolitans in each treatment group who provided
a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed trade opinion by appealing to (1) U.S.
interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns, (4)
economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to exactly
100%. The sample size for this analysis is 93.
provided for both support and opposition to trade.
Overwhelmingly, the foreign-regarding reasons offered by trade-supporting cosmopoli-
tans who received the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment reflect the desire to pro-
vide help to those who need it most. A typical response reads, “We are one world, and we
should encourage enterprise, particularly in disadvantaged countries, in order to provide
sustenance to all. The 500 employees sound like people who need a leg up.” Another
respondent explains her support for trade by writing, “So that these not-so-educated
workers can continue to be hired, So a poorer country than the US has a chance to
compete in the world.”
When responses that fall into Category 3 are also considered (i.e., when any men-
tion of foreign-regarding concerns is included in the analysis), 87% of trade-supporting
cosmopolitans appeal to foreign-regarding considerations in the Culturally Foreign/Low-
Skilled treatment group, versus 21.4% in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled treatment
group, 15.3% in the Culturally Foreign/Highly Skilled group, and 16.6% in the Culturally
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Familiar/Highly Skilled group.
Table 4.4: Reasons Offered by Trade-Supporting Cosmopolitans for Their
Expressed Support.
Reason Offered for Trade Support
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Group
U.S.
Interests
Only
Foreign-
Regarding
Concerns
Only
Both U.S.
Interests
and
Foreign-
Regarding
Economic
Principles Other
Culturally
Foreign/
Low-Skilled
8.7% 65.2% 21.7% 4.4% 0.0%
Culturally
Familiar/
Low-Skilled
50.0% 7.1% 14.3% 7.1% 7.1%
Culturally
Foreign/ Highly
Skilled
46.2% 15.3% 0.0% 0.0% 38.5%
Culturally
Familiar/ Highly
Skilled
50.0% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 25.0%
Note: The table presents the percentage of all trade-supporting cosmopolitans in each treatment group
who provided a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed support by appealing to
(1) U.S. interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns,
(4) economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to
exactly 100%. The sample size for this analysis is 62.
For comparative purposes, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 presents corresponding figures for non-
cosmopolitans in the sample. Here, foreign-regarding justifications are not especially
prominent in any group.
The results presented in this section suggest that the conditional effect of cultural dis-
tance on cosmopolitan support for trade is largely driven by a concern for the interests of
people abroad. More generally, the results provide the first evidence that foreign-regarding
considerations exist as sources of trade opinion, and that the trade preferences of individ-
uals with a particularly cosmopolitan worldview—that is, those with very positive atti-
tudes toward out-groups—are especially susceptible to the effect of such foreign-regarding
concerns.
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Table 4.5: Reasons Offered by All Non-Cosmopolitans for Their Expressed
Trade Preference.
Reason Offered for Expressed Trade Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Group
U.S.
Interests
Only
Foreign-
Regarding
Concerns
Only
Both U.S.
Interests
and
Foreign-
Regarding
Economic
Principles Other
Culturally
Foreign/
Low-Skilled
54.6% 7.6% 7.6% 9.2% 21.0%
Culturally
Familiar/
Low-Skilled
57.8% 5.9% 1.5% 11.1% 23.7%
Culturally
Foreign/ Highly
Skilled
52.5% 1.9% 5.8% 10.7% 29.1%
Culturally
Familiar/ Highly
Skilled
66.2% 0.8% 0.8% 5.3% 27.1%
Note: The table presents the percentage of all non-cosmopolitans in each treatment group who provided
a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed trade opinion by appealing to (1) U.S.
interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns, (4)
economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to exactly
100%. The sample size for this analysis is 490.
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Table 4.6: Reasons Offered by Trade-Supporting Non-Cosmopolitans for
Their Expressed Support.
Reason Offered for Expressed Trade Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment Group
U.S.
Interests
Only
Foreign-
Regarding
Concerns
Only
Both U.S.
Interests
and
Foreign-
Regarding
Economic
Principles Other
Culturally
Foreign/
Low-Skilled
35.1% 9.5% 12.2% 14.9% 28.4%
Culturally
Familiar/
Low-Skilled
48.4% 8.4% 2.1% 14.7% 26.3%
Culturally
Foreign/ Highly
Skilled
34.9% 3.2% 9.5% 17.5% 34.9%
Culturally
Familiar/ Highly
Skilled
55.9% 1.1% 1.1% 7.5% 34.4%
Note: The table presents the percentage of all trade-supporting non-cosmopolitans in each treatment
group who provided a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed support by appealing
to (1) U.S. interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding
concerns, (4) economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add
up to exactly 100%. The sample size for this analysis is 325.
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4.7 Some Potential Objections and Robustness
Checks
Admittedly, the findings of this chapter are suggestive rather than conclusive. Indeed,
further study is needed to solidify the conclusions that I draw. For example, an ex-
periment that explicitly manipulates the information that respondents receive about the
consequences of trade for foreigners would offer a more direct test of the causal effect
of foreign-regarding considerations on trade opinion. However, to the extent that my
findings provide evidence of foreign-regarding motivations, they withstand a variety of
objections and robustness checks.
First, readers might object that one of the central claims of this chapter is tautological.
Is it trivial to argue that individuals with very positive attitudes toward out-groups are
motivated by foreign-regarding concerns in the context of trade? Certainly, this claim is
an intuitive one. But I would argue that it is neither obvious nor uninteresting. Notice
that the argument I make is not simply that cosmopolitans care more about the well-
being of foreigners in general, but rather, that (a) they do so in a very particular context
(i.e., trade politics), and (b) that this concern has a significant impact on their policy
preferences. The evidence I have presented suggests that, under certain conditions, the
well-being of foreigners is easily the most prevalent consideration shaping trade opinion
among cosmopolitans. This particular result is not at all obvious a priori.
Second, readers might worry that the main result presented in Section 4.5 (i.e., the
increase in cosmopolitan trade support that results from cultural distance when low-
skilled workers are concerned) is driven—not by foreign-regarding considerations, as the
open-ended responses indicate—but by material self-interest. One might argue, in other
words, that if cosmopolitans are also among the highest skilled in society, they may be
less open to high-skill-intensive imports since these present the greatest threat to their
personal economic interests. None of the results presented in this chapter hold, however,
if skill level (proxied by education) is used instead of the SDO-based measure of symbolic
attitudes. Furthermore, it is clearly not the case that cosmopolitans favor low-skill-
intensive imports in general. In fact, of the four treatment conditions, cosmopolitan
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trade support is at its lowest in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled group, potentially
reflecting a desire to protect low-skilled workers at home over low-skilled workers in
another country that is (perceived to be) just as well off as the United States.
Another potential objection might stem from concerns that the open-ended responses
I analyze in this study are products of post-hoc rationalization, and therefore unreliable
indicators of what motivates trade opinion. While this is certainly a possibility, the fact
that the vast majority of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in the Culturally Foreign/Low-
Skilled group provide the same justification for their support alleviates this concern: it
is unlikely that so many respondents would rationalize in the same way.
Finally, the main results of the chapter largely hold when a different measure of
cosmopolitanism is used. As an alternative gauge of attitudes toward out-groups, I rely on
a commonly used measure of chauvinistic nationalism. Subjects in the survey experiment
were asked to express the degree of their agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: “In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior
to others.” Response options spanned a five-point scale, ranging from “Strongly agree”
to “Strongly disagree.” For the purposes of this analysis, I consider those who disagree
with this statement as cosmopolitans.
While the results are weaker when the nationalism measure is used, they are consis-
tent with the findings shown earlier. Among cosmopolitans who received the Low-Skilled
treatment, cultural distance leads to a 19% increase in the level of trade support, from
about 69% to 82% (p=0.094). Again, when the analysis is conditioned on the Highly
Skilled treatment, cultural distance has no effect on the trade preferences of cosmopoli-
tans. The analysis of open-ended responses using the nationalism measure also yields
results similar to those presented earlier: 42% of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in the
Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment group offer exclusively foreign-regarding rea-
sons to justify their support for trade, versus 12% in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled
group (p=0.022).
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4.8 Conclusions and Implications
Can beliefs about trade’s impact abroad shape public opinion toward international trade
at home? I have argued in this chapter that they can. My study suggests that among
individuals with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups, foreign-regarding consider-
ations are a potentially powerful source of trade preferences. Even if preliminary and
suggestive, this finding has significant implications. Most importantly, it reveals a new
and uncharted factor in the study of public opinion toward economic globalization. While
subjective beliefs about the impact of trade on self and country have recently received
attention as sources of trade opinion, the possibility of foreign-regarding considerations
has gone wholly unnoticed. This study exposes a very promising area for future research.
Evidence of foreign-regarding motivations also has significant implications for the
public politics of trade. If a sizeable portion of Americans (cosmopolitans consistently
represent 15%-30% of the population) can be motivated by a concern for foreigners in
the context of trade, trade-related elite messages may benefit from reference to foreign-
regarding considerations. While appealing to the interests of the neediest foreigners will
very likely not play well in the general population (we seldom, if ever, see such appeals
in the mainstream discourse on trade in the United States), in messages targeted to the
more globally-minded, the interests of foreigners may well be powerful movers of public
opinion.
The results of this study also raise some interesting questions about the politics of
trade more broadly: How does the particular political cleavage highlighted in this chapter
affect the current discourse and practice of trade politics? All things being equal, are
we more likely to sign trade agreements with countries that need our help most? These
questions highlight important avenues for future research.11
More generally, this chapter makes two further contributions to the study of pub-
lic opinion in international political economy. First, it presents analysis of open-ended
survey responses in this area, highlighting a powerful new means for the investigation
11I am grateful to Dustin Tingley for this point.
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of individual preferences over globalization. Second, it focuses especially on the prefer-
ences of those on the cosmopolitan end of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum. The role
of symbolic attitudes in the formation of trade preferences is not identical at both ends
of that spectrum. Delving more deeply into the micro-foundations of cosmopolitan trade
support has uncovered important findings.
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Appendix A
Figure 1A: Tuntyakore & Zideying’s Believed Country of Origin, Post-Treatment.
Note: Figure 1A classifies and presents respondents’ post-treatment beliefs about the geographic origin
of the hypothetical foreign firm, Tuntyakore & Zideying. Numbers represent the percentage of
respondents who identify the firm with the given category. I classified the countries and geographic
areas given by respondents according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region Groupings,
with three exceptions. First, I collapse the sub-regions identified by the UN classification as Northern,
Western, and Southern Europe into the one category commonly known as “Western Europe.” Second,
because about 50% of the respondents who identified Tuntyakore & Zideying as being from the African
continent did so by simply identifying the continent as a whole (i.e., “Africa”), I collapse the UN’s
African sub-regions into one category. Note that among the remaining 50% of responses that identified
the name as African, but did so more specifically by identifying a particular country or sub-region of the
continent, no particular area of Africa was overrepresented. In other words, all areas of the continent
were represented relatively evenly. Third, I include an additional category called “Asia” to represent
the small minority who responded to the question by simply answering “Asia” and not specifying any
particular country or region within that continent.
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Figure 2A: Gordon & Roberts’ Believed Country of Origin, Post-Treatment.
Note: : Figure 2A classifies and presents respondents’ post-treatment beliefs about the geographic origin
of the hypothetical foreign firm, Gordon & Roberts. Numbers represent the percentage of respondents
who identify the firm with the given category.
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Appendix B
Table 1B: Whole Sample Analysis.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DV=Bad Self-Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Age 0.009* 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Education -0.177** -0.169** -0.062*
(0.035) (0.033) (0.028)
Income -0.047** -0.062** -0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Female 0.544** 0.589** -0.085
(0.097) (0.091) (0.079)
White -0.041 0.307+ 0.059
(0.171) (0.177) (0.135)
Black -0.439+ -0.284 -0.506*
(0.265) (0.264) (0.213)
Hispanic -0.360 -0.088 -0.434+
(0.301) (0.293) (0.234)
Union Member 0.279* 0.378** 0.123
(0.126) (0.119) (0.106)
Democrat 0.031 0.308+ 0.316*
(0.177) (0.169) (0.144)
Republican 0.279+ -0.175 -0.077
(0.167) (0.161) (0.140)
Independent -0.152 -0.170 0.179
(0.170) (0.166) (0.139)
Economic Knowledge -0.179+ -0.218* -0.226**
(0.098) (0.094) (0.076)
Import Industry 0.276** 0.162 0.327**
(0.104) (0.101) (0.083)
Cultural Sentiment 0.571** 0.660** 0.191**
(0.058) (0.057) (0.048)
Constant -1.770** -1.743** -0.605*
(0.353) (0.345) (0.286)
N 3,738 3,741 3,743
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 2B: Split Sample Analysis, DV=Bad Self Impact.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DV=Bad Self-Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Age 0.014* 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009))
Education -0.162** -0.188** -0.166*
(0.056) (0.065) (0.068)
Income -0.068** 0.005 -0.087**
(0.022) (0.029) (0.033)
Female 0.301+ 0.510** 1.043**
(0.157) (0.172) (0.188)
White 0.110 -0.366 0.189
(0.296) (0.286) (0.318)
Black 0.422 -1.627** -0.217
(0.391) (0.476) (0.599)
Hispanic -0.075 -0.684 -0.449
(0.446) (0.534) (0.721)
Union Member 0.367+ 0.444* -0.042
(0.191) (0.222) (0.269)
Democrat 0.094 0.170 -0.132
(0.305) (0.311) (0.376)
Republican -0.340 -0.376 -0.247
(0.329) (0.283) (0.282)
Independent 0.038 -0.206 -0.393
(0.309) (0.289) (0.305)
Economic Knowledge -0.142 -0.228 -0.187
(0.158) (0.176) (0.192)
Import Industry 0.234 0.607** -0.099
(0.175) (0.174) (0.197)
Constant -1.497** -0.534 0.284
(0.553) (0.570) (0.649)
N 1,995 1,040 703
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 3B: Split Sample Analysis, DV=Bad US Impact.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DV=Bad Self-Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Age 0.006 -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Education -0.164** -0.175** -0.164*
(0.052) (0.061) (0.066)
Income -0.088** -0.010 -0.089**
(0.021) (0.028) (0.032)
Female 0.450** 0.613** 0.897**
(0.141) (0.164) (0.185)
White 0.481 -0.093 0.618+
(0.317) (0.294) (0.317)
Black 0.548 -1.469** 0.071
(0.402) (0.449) (0.607)
Hispanic 0.317 -0.767 0.008
(0.434) (0.546) (0.680)
Union Member 0.413* 0.451* 0.306
(0.178) (0.214) (0.259)
Democrat 0.450 0.477 0.200
(0.312) (0.301) (0.363)
Republican 0.006 -0.266 -0.258
(0.330) (0.276) (0.271)
Independent 0.079 -0.146 -0.479+
(0.321) (0.286) (0.289)
Economic Knowledge -0.157 -0.245 -0.286
(0.148) (0.171) (0.184)
Import Industry 0.067 0.538** -0.190
(0.170) (0.170) (0.194)
Constant -1.344* -0.444 0.561
(0.540) (0.568) (0.647)
N 1,994 1,044 703
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 4B: Split Sample Analysis, DV=Tariff Support.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DV=Bad Self-Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Age -0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Education -0.089* -0.094+ 0.025
(0.040) (0.054) (0.061)
Income -0.009 -0.031 -0.014
(0.017) (0.025) (0.031)
Female -0.080 -0.070 -0.106
(0.111) (0.150) (0.181)
White 0.241 -0.352 0.161
(0.199) (0.254) (0.279)
Black -0.032 -1.222** -0.581
(0.297) (0.390) (0.578)
Hispanic -0.262 -1.074* 0.184
(0.311) (0.488) (0.582)
Union Member 0.265+ -0.125 0.070
(0.145) (0.211) (0.234)
Democrat 0.594** 0.771** -0.666+
(0.226) (0.295) (0.351)
Republican 0.251 0.361 -0.921**
(0.236) (0.269) (0.269)
Independent 0.424+ 0.634* -0.590*
(0.229) (0.273) (0.281)
Economic Knowledge -0.193+ -0.291+ -0.185
(0.106) (0.149) (0.173)
Import Industry 0.223+ 0.516** 0.284
(0.120) (0.155) (0.182)
Constant -0.734+ -0.103 0.310
(0.389) (0.524) (0.603)
N 1,995 1,044 704
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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Table 5B: Interaction Analysis.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES DV=Bad Self-Impact DV=Bad US Impact DV=Tariff Support
Age 0.013** 0.008* 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Education -0.240** -0.244** -0.087**
(0.034) (0.033) (0.028)
Income -0.048** -0.063** -0.017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Female 0.501** 0.534** -0.092
(0.096) (0.090) (0.079)
White -0.079 0.251 0.045
(0.166) (0.173) (0.135)
Black -0.394 -0.216 -0.483*
(0.260) (0.256) (0.213)
Hispanic -0.468 -0.220 -0.470*
(0.297) (0.286) (0.234)
Union Member 0.274* 0.365** 0.124
(0.124) (0.116) (0.106)
Democrat -0.258 -0.047 0.218
(0.171) (0.164) (0.144)
Republican -0.249 -0.146 -0.066
(0.164) (0.159) (0.140)
Independent -0.275+ -0.318+ 0.137
(0.167) (0.164) (0.141)
Economic Knowledge -0.218* -0.257** -0.237**
(0.097) (0.093) (0.076)
Neutral Sentiment 0.045 -0.008 -0.064
(0.113) (0.107) (0.090)
Import Industry 0.119 0.002 0.250*
(0.125) (0.120) (0.098)
ImportIndustry* 0.470* 0.500* 0.267
NeutralSentiment (0.208) (0.204) (0.177)
Constant -0.557+ -0.301 -0.169
(0.322) (0.316) (0.272)
N 3,738 3,741 3,743
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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